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Carrots, Sticks, and Salience
BRIAN GALLE'
I. INTRODUCTION
Money is usually a good motivator.2 When market actors buy or
sell things that have unfortunate consequences for others-negative
externalities-a standard economic prescription is to raise the price of
the externality-producing good. 3 Alternatively, the bad actor can be
paid to stop. For policymakers, choosing between these two options,
the stick and the carrot, can be a difficult task even if people respond
as expected to cash incentives.4 But sometimes human beings make
mistakes. Social science shows that it is easy to overlook the tiny-print
disclaimer that "price does not include $4.95 shipping and handling"
when ordering a shiny new set of knives.5 If people are sometimes
similarly neglectful of the carrots and sticks policymakers deliberately
offer to change their behavior, what happens to the policy? How
should policymakers respond to that problem? And is it ever desira-
1 Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. I am grateful for helpful comments
from Ben Alarie, Neil Buchanan, Gerrit De Geest, David Gamage, Jacob Goldin, Louis
Kaplow, Wojciech Kopczuk, Gregg Polsky, Alex Raskolnikov, Chris Sanchirico, Rich
Schmalbeck, Darien Shanske, and Larry Zelenak, as well as attendees of presentations at
Columbia Law School, Duke University Law School, and the Canadian Law and
Economics Association.
2 See, e.g., Sean Combs, It's All About the Benjamins, on No Way Out (Bad Boy
Records 1997). But see It's All About the Benjamins vs. Actually the Benjamins Are Only
a Small Part of a Larger Set of Concerns, The Onion (Sept. 1, 1999), http://
www.theonion.com/articles/its-all-about-the-benjamins-vs-actually-the-benjam,11548/.
3 E.g., Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 135 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing
"corrective taxation" as a means of addressing negative externalities).
4 My own analysis of the carrot/stick problem can be found in Brian Galle, The Tragedy
of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan. L. Rev.
797, 813-40 (2012). For earlier efforts, see Thomas Sterner, Policy Instruments for Envi-
ronmental and Natural Resource Management 167-79 (2003); Howard F. Chang, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L.J. 2131,
2149-64 (1995); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Mul-
tiplication Effect, 26 J.L. Econ. & Org. 365, 369-75 (2010); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677, 701-96
(1999).
5 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505, 505-23, 526-32
(2006); Vicki G. Morwitz, Eric A. Greenleaf, Edith Shalev & Eric J. Johnson, The Price
Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A Review of Research on Par-
titioned Pricing 1-23, 25-35, 38-40 (Feb. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1350004.
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ble deliberately to hide sticks or carrots? This Article considers these
questions.
These questions are not wholly new, but the literature that grapples
with them seriously is only a couple of years old. As recently as 2009,
I asserted-at the time rightly, I believe-that it was generally agreed
that taxes intended to change individual behavior should always be as
visible as possible, or "salient," in the marketplace. 6 Thanks to impor-
tant contributions by David Gamage and Darien Shanske, Hunt
Allcott, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Dmitry Taubinsky, and Jacob Gol-
din, it is now becoming clearer that the analysis is not necessarily so
straightforward.7 For that reason, in my earlier work on the choice
between carrots and sticks, I deliberately left open the question
whether my conclusions could hold up if market actors are sometimes
imperfectly rational.8
I try here to advance these earlier works in a few different ways.
For one, I want to refine the analysis offered so far. Gamage and
Shanske argue that low-salience taxes can be just as effective at chang-
ing behavior if policymakers increase their price to make up for the
taxes' low visibility.9 Picking up that thread, I examine to what extent
this claim is still true when externality producers vary in their ability
to notice the change in price. I also consider to what extent it is ever
optimal for the government deliberately to reduce or raise the sali-
ence of a stick. I conclude that often the ideal combination reduces
salience somewhat, but without fully offsetting the behavioral effects
of that reduction with increased prices. In essence, government must
trade off four different considerations: the cost of under-incentivizing
"naive" individuals who cannot recognize the hidden stick, the cost of
over-incentivizing "sophisticated" individuals who see the stick's real
price, the possible welfare losses from confusing consumers, and the
possible benefits from bringing in more government revenues.' 0 Since
these effects are rarely perfectly symmetrical, it sometimes will make
6 Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 78 n.89 (2009). I was not alone.
See note 91.
7 Hunt Allcott, Sendhil Mullainathan & Dmitry Taubinsky, Energy Policy with External-
ities and Internalities, 112 J. Pub. Econ. 72 (2014); David Gamage & Darien Shanske,
Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19
(2011); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inat-
tentive Consumers, 122 Yale L.J. 258 (2012).
8 See Galle, note 4, at 849.
9 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 71-74.
10 For the most part, my analysis omits possible distributive effects. Although I view
distribution as a key question in the policy merits both of carrots and sticks, see Galle, note
4, at 817-20, and tax salience generally, see Galle, note 6, at 100-04, my analysis here al-
ready has so many moving parts, and we know so little about salience's distributive conse-
quences, that further discussion is best left for other work.
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sense to give up some of one to improve things along one of the other
dimensions.
Another contribution I will attempt to offer is to extend this "tax
salience" discussion to price instrument theory." So far, those two
literatures have mostly not overlapped, which has led to some over-
sights. For instance, price instrument theory implies that there are po-
tentially important variations between the two different ways that
changes in price affect our decisions: relative cost, or substitution ef-
fects, and the total size of our budget, or income effects.12 Differences
in income effects are in my view the main justification for ever prefer-
ring carrots over sticks.13 Therefore, it is important to consider the
impact of salience and offsetting adjustments on both substitution and
income effects separately. To take one example, adjusting prices
upwards to offset low salience could also shrink the budgets of af-
fected consumers, which in turn may prevent consumers from buying
goods that produce externalities. That is usually a good thing for neg-
ative externalities, but often a problem for positive externalities.
A second extension is to use the tax debate to help policymakers
choose between carrots and sticks. A few commentators have noted
that salience can also affect efforts to reward positive-externality pro-
ducers, but other than cautioning that it might be possible to have too
much of a good thing, these authors have not applied all of the formal
analysis of price instrument theory.14 Here again I think some of my
findings are surprising. For instance, in some cases it might be ideal to
have carrots be totally hidden from view, at least from those who are
likely to have been willing to produce the good without any encour-
agement. Indeed, it is possible that salience can improve carrots by
such an extent that they might actually become a viable policy option,
even though under standard price theory sticks are almost always the
better choice.
11 For overviews of the literature on price instruments, see Sterner, note 4, at 167-79;
Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument
Choice, 22 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y 226 passim (2006).
12 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1095-96, 1120-21 (1972).
13 See Galle, note 4, at 838. For other arguments in favor of carrots, see Gerrit De
Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 341, 367-69 (2013).
14 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Intro-
duction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1307, 1339-44 (2012); Brian Galle & Jonathan
Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a
Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 246 (2010); see also Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 278 (2007) (noting,
without further comment, that internalization theories of intellectual property assume that
"a decisionmaker will rationally act to maximize her own welfare").
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It is worth emphasizing here at the beginning that in some ways this
is a science fiction story. Most of the important questions about sali-
ence are still unanswered. It may turn out that price changes can only
meaningfully be hidden when they are too small to have important
policy effects. Or the initial salience of a price instrument may have
important effects on how people learn about the instrument. My
work here necessarily has to rely on supposition and the best available
evidence.
It might also be argued that this project is not just science fiction,
but actually the work of a mad scientist. Policy advocates (rightly, in
my opinion) call for efforts to protect consumers from efforts to
"shroud" prices.15 Whether manipulating salience is ethical, consis-
tent with democratic values, or in the long run healthy for democracy
is an important question. 16 I largely set it aside here, though, because
I argue that salience effects are likely inevitable, even if not deliber-
ately invited by government actors. People need time to understand
complex new policies, and the behavior of nongovernmental third par-
ties can affect how the public perceives price instruments. Policymak-
ers therefore often must confront the problem that the response to
price instruments will depart from standard accounts of rational be-
havior; at a minimum, my analysis helps us to understand how policy
should respond to those departures.
II. BACKGROUND
Before diving into the psychology of price instruments, some read-
ers may find it helpful to have a brief review of what price instruments
are and what economic theory thinks they are good for. Readers who
know that story, but who have not encountered my earlier work on
the subject, can skip to the following Section for a short recap of the
best methods for choosing among different price instruments for dif-
ferent kinds of problems. Readers unfamiliar with recent develop-
ments in the tax salience literature may also wish to read Section C.
All readers may also want to read that Section C briefly for an intro-
duction to my terminology going forward, as well as some slight re-
finements to existing salience theory.
15 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6-7
(2008); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 721-49 (1999).
16 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J.
on Reg. 253, 287-89 (2011) (arguing that manipulating salience can be consistent with dem-
ocratic values).
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A. Price Instruments as a Response to Market Failure
Modern economic theories of government regulation begin with the
premise that markets sometimes fail.17 Externalities are a classic ex-
ample.18 An externality, simply put, is a harm or benefit that affects
someone other than the actor making an economic decision.19 When
the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow "shot an arrow into the air, / It
fell to earth [he] knew not where," 20 that was an externality-and a
particularly pointy one. Not all externalities are harmful or "nega-
tive." When Newton noted that he stood "on ye shoulders of Gi-
ants," 21 he was acknowledging the positive externalities provided to
him by great thinkers of the past.
Externalities are a problem in an unregulated market. Longfellow's
unmediated archery exercises are, at best, costly for neighbors who
must invest in armor, or at least sturdy roofs. Absent some negotiated
solution between Longfellow and these neighbors,22 Longfellow has
no economic reason to care about his stray missiles or their in ter-
rorem effects on neighboring investments. And clearly Newton has
no way to negotiate with Brahe and Galileo to reward them for their
efforts. True, most backyard archers have some conscience. And
some inventors are motivated by glory, love of man, or professional
norms.23 But not all are, or in any event are not motivated enough to
produce the amount of externality that would best meet society's
needs.
Economists offer a trio of standard solutions to the externalities
problem. A first is regulation or prohibition, sometimes called "quan-
tity regulation." 24 "No more than one backyard arrow per day, or you
go to jail." Price instruments form a second broad category.25 These
include measures familiar from first-year law courses, such as tort lia-
bility, as well as taxes and subsidies. 26 The third group, disclosure and
17 Gruber, note 3, at 3.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id. at 122.
20 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Arrow and the Song, in Poems and Other Writ-
ings 53 (J.D. McClatchy ed., Library of Am. 2000) (1845).
21 Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/6), in 1 The Correspon-
dence of Isaac Newton 416, 416 (H.W. Turnbull ed., 1959).
22 As readers likely know, the possibility that parties may be able to bargain to achieve
efficient outcomes itself has a long pedigree, most famously in R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).
23 See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions,
51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 522-36 (2009).
24 See Gruber, note 3, at 137.
25 See Sterner, note 4, at 212-13.
26 See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, note 13, at 343.
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information sharing, either alone or in combination with other tools,
can also help to move markets. 27
All three tools share a common goal of achieving what might be
called the optimal level of externality. 28 Government could ban arch-
ery entirely, but then how will Longfellow hunt his dinner? More
prosaically, eliminating even the worst pollutants is costly. Should
government bankrupt coal producers, or is there a way to balance
clean air against the costs of achieving it? On the positive externality
side, everyone might agree that charity is beneficial. But how much
should government spend to clothe or educate one more child?
Marginal analysis is the standard answer to these kinds of balancing
questions.29 Under this approach, the policymaker asks herself, "On
the margin-that is, for the very next unit of good or bad produced-
what is the harm or benefit of that one unit for everyone in society?"
We might therefore call this the "marginal social damage," in the case
of a negative externality, and "marginal social benefit" for a positive
one. The policy maker then compares this harm or benefit against the
marginal costs to the producer. If the producer's private marginal cost
is greater than the marginal social damage, it does not pay, on net, to
prevent the damage: Counting the producer's losses, society would
lose by forcing the producer to avoid the externality.30
This last point is a key one for later discussion, and deserves some
extra emphasis. Assuming that we value the welfare of polluters as
much as we value the well-being of the rest of the public (and, admit-
tedly, that is a large assumption) then excessive reduction of pollution
is just as bad as insufficient reduction.31 If Pete Polluter spends $150
to avoid a harm that would cost his neighbors only $100, society is
worse off by $50 overall. This $50 overspending is usually called dead-
weight loss-money or effort spent that accomplishes no other pur-
pose.32 In other words, we have to count the costs of changing the
quantity of an externality when we figure out how much of it we want.
27 See Evert Vedung & Frans C.J. van der Doelen, The Sermon: Information Programs
in the Public Policy Process-Choice, Effects, and Evaluation, in Carrots, Sticks, and Ser-
mons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation 103, 103-28 (Marie-Louise Bemelmans-
Videc, Ray C. Rist & Evert Verdung eds., 2003).
28 See Gruber, note 3, at 137-39; Gloria E. Helfand, Peter Berck & Tim Maull, The
Theory of Pollution Policy, in 1 Handbook of Environmental Economics 249,252-54 (Karl-
Goran Mller & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003).
29 See Gruber, note 3, at 126.
30 See id. at 124-25. Note, importantly, that for simplicity one assumes here that one
should count the costs and benefits for the producer and everyone else equally. See id.
That is a controversial proposition, but I leave it aside here for ease of exposition.
31 See id. at 139.
32 See id. at 51-52.
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Price and quantity instruments differ in their approach to reaching
this optimal level of externality.33 Under a typical quantity regulation,
the quantity the government should set, optimally, as the correct
amount is the quantity at which private costs for further changes in
the amount of externality produced first begin to exceed social bene-
fits. 3 4 To do that, of course, the government must decide for itself the
optimal level, which means that it must know not only the marginal
social damage or marginal social benefit but also the private cost
structure of producers.35
Price instruments are typically a bit less demanding.36 Suppose the
government knows only the marginal social damage of an externality.
It then can set a fee or tax-often called a Pigouvian tax, after its first
expositor, the economist A.C. Pigou-equal to that amount.37 Pro-
ducers then reveal their cost structure to the government by deciding
whether to pay the tax. Suppose the tax is $100 and it costs Wanda the
Widget-Maker $101 to avoid creating widget sludge, a form of pollu-
tion. Wanda should go ahead and produce the sludge, paying the tax.
That option is $1 cheaper for her, and for society overall. By doing so,
33 See id. at 137-46.
34 See id. at 137. I am simplifying here for the sake of exposition. A more rigorous
approach to setting the optimal quantity would also account for other factors that might
affect the efficiency of the regulation. For example, if the regulation imposes costs and the
expectation of those costs changes behaviors other than the production of the externality-
for example, distorts consumer choices among products-the ideal regulation might bal-
ance disruption of these expectations against pollution control. See Helmuth Cremer,
Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 J. Pub. Econ.
343, 346 (1998).
Another complication is that efficient regulation requires that the marginal costs of abat-
ing pollution be equal across all polluting sources-or, putting the same point a different
way, government should ask for less abatement at firms where abatement is very expensive
and more at those where it is cheap. See Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Economics, in
2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 886, 886-87 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence
E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). Some simpler forms of regulation would have trouble satisfy-
ing this requirement, although the invention of tradable permits has made the task much
easier for sources, such as those that do not produce "hot spots," where trading is feasible.
See id. at 887. Under certain assumptions, tradable permits are in many ways equivalent to
a price instrument, see Hepburn, note 11, at 229, with the important exception that the
permitting system allows for imposition of hard caps on the quantity. Thus quantity mea-
sures are usually thought to be preferable when it is important to get the quantity of exter-
nality right. See id. at 241, 243. But this may be inaccurate if governments can use tax
schedules that vary together with the expected marginal harm or if government is stuck
with a flat rate but can adjust it in response to new information. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am. L. &
Econ. Rev. 1, 7-10 (2002).
3s Gruber, note 3, at 140. For more discussion of the level of detail a government regu-
lator might need to regulate optimally, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J.
1163, 1264-68 (1998).
36 See Kaplow & Shavell, note 34, at 4.
37 See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 192-94 (4th ed. 1932).
she reveals to observers that her private costs are at least $100. Alter-
nately, government could use a carrot instead of a stick: It could offer
to pay Wanda $100 for each unit she reduces. Again, Wanda will ac-
cept if the cost for her of reducing sludge is less than $100.
Because of this considerable informational advantage, a number of
commentators favor price instruments, at least when everything else is
equal.38 Since my focus here is on how to design a price instrument,
for now I do not elaborate on other factors that might influence gov-
ernment's choice between price and quantity regulation. Instead, I
now consider a second choice-assuming regulators pick a price in-
strument, what kind of price instrument should they use?
B. The Tragedy of the Carrots: A Brief Review
Once policymakers decide to rely on a price instrument, they have a
choice between rewarding or penalizing, between carrots and sticks.
Both options have similar effects on the marginal incentives of exter-
nality producers. 39 Whether producers are rewarded, or nonproduc-
ers fined, compliance with the government's objective can save money
relative to noncompliance.40 The two mechanisms, however, vary in a
number of other important ways. Which option is the better choice
for a particular policy depends largely on these other factors.41
Sticks are, except in unusual circumstances, the more efficient tool
for reigning in the social overproduction of some negative-externality-
laden good.42 Sticks earn the government money, while carrots drain
the treasury, wasting hard-won tax revenues. 43 Revenue is critical be-
cause raising taxes is costly: In addition to paying the tax, many peo-
ple also change their behavior to minimize taxes, causing deadweight
loss. 44 In addition, carrots give producers more resources to create
the unwanted good.45 Similarly, in many cases, as individuals get
wealthier, they demand more of the undesirable product, a phenome-
non known as the income effect. 46 Carrots are also wasteful if produc-
ers plan to cut back on their activities anyway. And overproducers
who know they will be paid to curtail their activities in the future have
38 See, e.g., Hepburn, note 11, at 228-29.
39 See Helfand et al., note 28, at 277-78.
40 See id. at 278.
41 See Galle, note 4, at 809-13.
42 For development of the points in this paragraph, see id. at 813-31.
43 For a caveat to this point, see text accompanying notes 112-15.
44 See Gruber, note 3, at 51-52.
45 See id. at 36.
46 See id. at 36. For example, poorer commuters may take the bus, while richer ones
may prefer to drive. See id.
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an incentive to begin overproducing, while the opposite is true of
sticks.
In contrast, carrots are more defensible for encouraging the produc-
tion of a good with positive externalities, where we would expect so-
cial underproduction. 47 In that case, the fact that carrot recipients
have more resources is desirable, since we want them to produce or
demand more of the good.48 On the other hand, it is still the case that
the expectation of future carrots has unwanted incentive effects, en-
couraging producers to delay producing the good until the govern-
ment agrees to pay them. And carrots remain costlier, especially
when factoring in the possibility that some might altruistically produce
the good without subsidy. So although carrots are less clearly domi-
nated by sticks in the positive externality setting, there remains a
question whether they are worth the cost.
To see the important difference that income effects may have on the
production of externalities, consider Figure 1. This figure graphs, in a
highly simplified way, the private costs of reducing (increasing) nega-
tive (positive) externalities against their private social costs (benefits).
Government typically will set the price of a carrot or stick at the inter-
section of these two curves, which one can call the equilibrium price,
represented here by point A. Once more, this is the optimal price: At
any higher point, the tax will wastefully overincentivize producers,
while at any lower point it will leave on the table some additional,
efficient, changes in externality levels. The rightward arrow depicts
the impact of carrots on the production of positive externalities, or the
effect of sticks on the curtailment of negative externalities. 49 By in-
creasing the wealth of, say, donors to charity, government has caused
each donor to be willing to create more charity for any given dollar
amount of subsidy. Thus, the income effect of the subsidy increases
total output, without affecting the efficient subsidy amount. Sticks for
positive externalities, or carrots for negative would move the cost
curve leftwards, diminishing the efficacy of government incentives.50
47 See id. at 43-50 (noting that unregulated markets tend to underproduce goods with
positive externalities).
48 See Galle, note 4, at 832.
49 Sticks can shift the private cost curve rightwards for two reasons. In the case of indi-
viduals who pay the stick, their demand for the polluting good declines. They will demand
less of it for each dollar of government incentive. In the case of firms, the stick reduces
output, meaning that there are fewer polluting goods sold.
50 Information techniques can function similarly; by allowing firms to discover best prac-
tices for, say, clean production processes, the government encourages firms to reduce their
private costs, shifting the curve rightwards. See Lori Snyder Bennear & Robert N. Stavins,
Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments, 37 Envtl. & Resource
Econ. 111, 121 (2007).
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FIGURE 1
INCOME EFFECTS AND PRICE INSTRUMENTS
Producer's
Marginal Costs
Cost
Social Marginal
Damage/Benefit
Quantity
Despite the theoretical inferiority of carrots in most situations, they
are extremely popular as policy tools.5' I argue that this unfortunate
result is the product both of straightforward public choice considera-
tions as well as less-obvious aspects of U.S. law and government struc-
ture.52 For example, decentralization encourages carrots, because
sticks usually redistribute away from externality producers, and com-
peting subnational governments typically cannot engage in extensive
redistribution.
It is worth mentioning here two potential questions about my analy-
sis that I did not consider in my earlier work. Kaplow might argue
that most of the differences between the two instruments would disap-
pear if either were enacted together with a perfectly offsetting tax or
tax cut.53 I do not disagree, and even agree that such perfect offsets
51 See, e.g., Hepburn, note 11, at 236-37; Frans L. Leeuw, The Carrot: Subsidies as a
Tool of Government-Theory and Practice, in Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons, note 27, at 77,
77 (reporting that major European countries spend between 20% and 35% of their GDP
on grants and subsidies); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, note 12, at 1117 (noting that their rule
four, in which victims compensate polluters for limiting their right to pollute, "may well be
the most frequent device employed").
52 Galle, note 4, at 840-45.
53 See Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 13-35 (2008), for
general discussion, and Louis Kaplow, Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change, in U.S. Energy
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might often be theoretically ideal. My goal is only to consider the
second-best outcomes in the absence of optimal offsets. That is, I ana-
lyze the implementation of the price instrument in isolation from any
such offsets, which after all so far have not been observed. in practice.
In addition, in the context I analyze here, where the incidence of a
Pigouvian tax depends on the foibles of human cognition, enacting
perfectly offsetting income tax adjustments may well be infeasible.
There may also be some instances in which income effects do not
have the impact I have described so far. In some cases, reducing a
negative externality could involve increasing demand from externality
producers. For example, families might be encouraged to switch out
old air conditioners that leak Freon for newer models. But curtailing
negative externalities most commonly involves reducing the undesir-
able good, such as when we want to contain pollution, smoking, or
fatty foods. 5 4 And when government wants to develop positive exter-
nality production, it is usually attempting to spur the creation of new
goods, such as hospitals or research labs.55 These are the archetypes
on which my claims about income effects rest.
C. Three Dimensions of Salience
Until very recently the modern literature on price instruments re-
lied on the assumption that economic actors respond rationally to
price changes. 56 As I noted at the outset, though, evidence increas-
ingly suggests that this assumption is implausible. For example, many
studies now document consumers' failures to maximize what appears
to outside observers to be the consumers' subjective well-being.5 7
Consumers apparently underweight "hidden" fees, such as ongoing
small service charges or extra markups for shipping or Internet
access.58
Tax Policy 168, 186-88 (Gilbert E. Metcalf ed., 2010), for analysis specifically in the carbon
tax context. I am grateful to Kaplow for pressing this point in conversation.
5 See Galle, note 4, at 816-17.
55 See id. at 838-39.
56 See Hepburn, note 11, at 235.
57 For reviews, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Eco-
nomics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard Decision Makers, in Behavioral
Economics and Its Applications 7, 10-65 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2008);
Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. Econ.
Literature 315 passim (2009).
58 Hyeong Min Kim & Luke Kachersky, Dimensions of Price Salience: A Conceptual
Framework for Perceptions of Multi-Dimensional Prices, 15 J. Product & Brand Mgmt.
139, 139-47 (2006); Aradhna Krishna, Richard Briesh, Donald R. Lehmann & Hong Yunn,
A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. Retailing
101, 101-18 (2002); Vicki G. Morwitz, Eric A. Greenleaf & Eric J. Johnson, Divide and
Prosper: Consumers' Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J. Marketing Res. 453, 453-63
(1998).
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The literature on tax salience supplies the most direct evidence that
price instruments may not function as predicted by classic theory. Re-
cent real-world and laboratory results find that taxpayers appear to
neglect at least some of the economic consequences of taxes when
they make decisions.59 Consumers preferred household products
whose posted prices did not include the sales tax to those where the
tax was included,60 were less aware of road tolls when their toll was
debited automatically from an electronic account, 61 and bought more
cigarettes when taxes were not included in the posted price.62
Taxpayers are not necessarily totally ignorant of low-salience taxes.
Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft speculate that taxpayers
may be aware that there is tax, but simply choose not to calculate its
precise impact.63 Alternately, as I have argued, taxpayers may be
aware of the tax but lack the cognitive ability or willpower to make
exact calculations.64 In line with these theories, Naomi Feldman and
Bradley Ruffle find in experiments that their subjects tend to respond
partially to the full price of a tax.65 Similarly, Jacob Goldin models
salience as a discount factor, 0.66 When 0 is one, the taxpayer accu-
rately computes the cost of the tax, but when 0 is below one, she ig-
nores some or all of the cost of the tax.
In some instances taxpayers may actually overestimate the cost of a
tax. For example, Benjamin Miller and Kevin Mumford found that
real households overestimated the benefits they would gain from the
2003 expansion of the Child and Dependent Care Credit.67 Because
of complex interactions with other tax provisions, the value of that
credit was less than its "sticker" price for many families, but it appears
that families responded to the credit's incentive to hire paid childcare
assistance as though they all were getting its full value.68 Similarly,
James Sallee reports that the notoriously complicated Alternative
59 For reviews, see Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 26-54, and Allcott et al., note 7, at 79.
60 Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evi-
dence, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1145, 1153-56 (2009).
61 Amy Finkelstein, EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. Econ. 969, 980-83
(2009).
62 Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience
and Regressivity, 5 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 302, 328-31 (2012).
63 See Chetty et al., note 60, at 1173-75.
64 See Galle, note 6, at 81-85.
65 See Naomi E. Feldman & Bradley J. Ruffle, The Impact of Tax Exclusive and Inclu-
sive Prices on Demand 25 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2026937.
66 Goldin, note 7, at 273.
67 See Benjamin M. Miller & Kevin J. Mumford, Personal Income Tax Salience: Evi-
dence from the Child and Dependent Care Credit Expansion 2 Krannert School of Mgmt.,
Purdue U., Working Paper No. 1261, 2014), available at www.Krannert.perdue.edu/faculty/
kjmnmfor/papers/Personal%20Income%2OTax%20Salience.pdf.
68 See id. at 8-17.
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Minimum Tax left some hybrid-car purchasers "surprised to find that
they could not benefit from the [hybrid vehicle] credit." 69 That is,
buyers bought their cars expecting to get a tax benefit, and then did
not. Likewise Jacob Goldin and Yair Listokin describe their online
survey in which some participants erroneously believed they were
benefitting from some charitable contribution deductions and the
home mortgage interest deduction.70 And, finally, Shanjun Li, Joshua
Linn, and Erich Muehlegger find that gas buyers actually seem more
responsive to changes in gas tax than to other changes in the costs of
fuel, which they suggest could be related to more extensive media and
consumer attention.71 In Goldin's terms, all these taxpayers appear to
have e greater than one.
Lilian Faulhaber chooses a less mathematical nomenclature, dub-
bing these overestimates of tax price "hypersalience," and suggests
two possible explanations.72 One explanation is simply complexity.73
What looks like a benefit is not always a benefit. For example, as
Lawrence Zelenak argues, taxpayers who do not understand the tax
code's complex system of phase-outs may believe there is a tax incen-
tive for them when there is not.7 4
Third parties, especially those who might capture some of the bene-
fit of the price instrument, can be another source of hypersalience.
Faulhaber's key example is fundraising by nonprofits: Since charities
benefit when donors want to give more, it is in the charities' interests
to make taxpayers highly aware of the benefits of giving.75 It is rather
less in the charities' short-term interest to make donors aware of sig-
nificant limits on potential tax benefits, such as the annual cap on de-
ductible donations.76 Other examples abound. Hardware stores, not
usually a good source of tax advice, were in 2010 plastered with signs
touting "weatherization tax credits."77 Kelly Gallagher and Erich
69 James M. Sallee, The Surprising Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius, 3 Am.
Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 189, 216 (2011).
7o Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience, 15 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
(forthcoming 2014), (manuscript at 5-8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2097836.
71 See Shanjun Li, Joshua Linn & Erich Muehlegger, Gasoline Taxes and Consumer
Behavior 6 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 12-13), available
at http://www/nber.org/papers/wl7891.
72 Faulhaber, note 14, at 1316-18.
73 Id. at 1317.
74 See Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 Colum. J.
Tax L. 91, 110-11 (2010).
75 Faulhaber, note 14, at 1328-30.
76 See id. at 1329.
77 See, e.g., Home Depot, Get Credit for Saving Energy: 6 Weeks Left for Eligible 2011
Tax Credit Purchases, http://community.homedepot.com/t5/lnstall-Replace/Get-Credit-for-
saving-energy-6-weeks-left-for-eligible-2011-Tax-/td-p33807.
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Muehlegger claim to find evidence along these lines, arguing that their
finding of greater impact of hybrid-car tax credits around tax season
implies an important role for advertising and salience more
generally.78
In addition to affecting the decision to buy or sell goods and ser-
vices, salience can also affect voters' political preferences for various
tax regimes. As I have observed, and as Deborah Schenk and
Gamage and Shanske emphasize, a tax may be highly salient for mar-
ket purposes but largely invisible politically, or vice versa. 79 Convinc-
ing evidence that "political salience,"80 actually changes tax rates is
considerably scarcer than the evidence for "market" salience.81 The
closest is likely Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby, who report that
property taxes are higher in jurisdictions where a larger portion of
homeowners do not pay their property tax bills directly.8 2 Salience
may also affect other interactions with the government, such as the
decision to file legal claims or challenge tax assessments.83
The literature also identifies but so far has not emphasized a possi-
ble difference in the saliences of income and substitution effects.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft explain that a consumer who neglects the
impact of a tax potentially is making two different errors: One is a
mistake of comparison shopping, the other a mistake of budgeting.8
Taxes matter for relative prices, or substitution effects, such as when
we decide whether paying a bit more for bouncier curls is worth-
while.85 But if they add up to real money, taxes should also matter in
terms of which goods buyers should want: Can we afford hair product
at all, or should we be saving up for rent? This is the income effect.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft suggest that tax salience may have a differ-
78 See Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green: Incen-
tives and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt.
1, 2 (2011).
79 See Galle, note 6, at 99; Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 54-59; Schenk, note 17, at 272-
85.
80 Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 33-35, Schenk, note 16, at 272-74.
81 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 34-54.
82 See Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates,
and Tax Revolts 37 (Nat'1 Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18514, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8514. Another suggestive result is Asmus Leth Ol-
sen, The Politics of Digits: Evidence of Odd Taxation, 154 Pub. Choice 59, 67-71 (2013),
who finds that the last digits of Danish municipal tax rates tend to be closer to nine than
one, perhaps implying that officials, like merchants, emphasize the leftmost digit of a price.
83 See Andrew Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation 31-37 (Sept. 14, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=2151867.
84 See Chetty et al., note 60, at 1173-74.
85 The author no longer has this problem. See Boston College Law School, http://
www.bc.edulcontent/bc/schools/law/fac-staff/deans-faculty/galleb.html (demonstrating au-
thor's advanced male-pattern baldness).
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ent impact on income effects than on substitution effects, depending
on how consumers budget. 86 For example, a household planner might
look at last month's bank balance to decide how to shop for the com-
ing months; even if the planner does not know that it was taxes that
ate up part of her savings, she knows what it cost to live the way she
did. The tax would then be salient for income-effect purposes but not
for substitution effects.
The salience of income effects has mostly been neglected in the
literature so far but is potentially fairly important. The split between
income and substitution effects is a key factor in the choice of price
instrument. In some cases, I argue, different salience for the two ef-
fects either undermines or allows for a more effective design of price
instruments. 87
III. SALIENCE AND INSTRUMENT PRICING
What happens to the standard analysis of price instruments, and the
nuances I attempted to add, when the targets of those instruments are
inattentive or overly attentive to their effects? To help keep things
simple, I focus my analysis on two examples of price instruments. The
first is a carbon tax imposed on consumer purchases of carbon-pro-
ducing goods. The second is the charitable contribution deduction, a
benefit granted by federal tax law8 8 , as well as a number of states and
other countries89 to encourage donations to charity. Since the deduc-
tion reduces an expected cost, it can be thought of as a carrot. "Char-
ity" is typically defined by law as an endeavor that produces goods
with beneficial spillovers for people other than the purchaser, such as
schools and arts institutions.90 The analysis thus considers two arche-
typical price instruments, one a stick aimed at curbing negative exter-
nalities and the other a carrot to tempt producers of positive-
externality goods.
86 Chetty et al., note 60, at 1173-74.
87 More generally, if salience reduces income effects, then low-income-salience taxes
would be relatively less efficient than the salience literature so far predicts. Income effects
are usually thought to help counterbalance the tendency of taxes to discourage work. I
have previously argued that low-salience taxes could allow for more progressive taxation
by diminishing this disincentive. See Galle, note 6, at 104-05. But I now partially repent of
that view: If low-substitution-salience is combined with low-income-salience, the com-
bined impact of the salience could potentially on net reduce incentives to work.
88 IRC § 170.
89 See Roger Colinvaux, Brian Galle & Eugene Steuerle, Evaluating the Charitable De-
duction and Proposed Reforms 6 (Urban Inst., June 2012), available at http://www.urban
.org/UploadedPDF/412586-Evaluating-the-Charitable-Deduction-and-Proposed-
Reforms.pdf.
90 E.g., Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 155 (10th ed. 2011).
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I argue that the potential implications of salience are pretty wide-
ranging, but cluster around two big questions. First, does salience af-
fect the price the government should set for the instrument? And sec-
ond, does salience affect which instrument is the right tool for a
particular problem? I discuss the first in this Part. To be more pre-
cise, I examine whether government should alter the value of price
instruments to account for salience, whether it should alter salience to
account for the desired impact of the instrument, or maybe a little bit
of both.
In fact, my central claim in this Part is that the government's best
strategy will often be to mix price adjustments with adjustments to
salience itself. Prior analyses of the salience of Pigouvian taxes have
argued for or against fully offsetting the impact of salience with
changes in price. But I try to show that with plausible assumptions
neither of those choices is ideal. I then extend that basic result to a
number of permutations-testing whether we would want different
outcomes if we switch from carbon tax to the charitable contribution,
from low-salience to hypersalient instruments, and if there is correla-
tion between an externality producer's propensity to recognize the
true price of the instrument and their costs of complying with the gov-
ernment's preference.
A. The Basic Case: Carbon Taxes and Low Salience
Most early commentators on tax salience assumed that Pigouvian
taxes should always be fully salient,91 but it is now clear that story was
at best incomplete. Two recent articles, by Jacob Goldin, and Gamage
and Shanske, respectively, argue that a low-salience tax on externali-
ties might outperform a fully salient tax. The articles differ in that
Goldin defends the possible efficiency of a low-salience tax standing
alone,92 while Gamage and Shanske argue for the efficiency of a low-
salience tax whose price is adjusted to account for its salience. 93 I
think both are right but that there is a third outcome potentially better
than either. To see why, I need to unpack their arguments some more.
For readers most interested in math, I also offer some relatively infor-
mal modeling-assuming for simplicity a world in which cost curves
are linear over the range of interest-in the margins.
91 See Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax Revolution: Can Technology Solve Tax Com-
plexity?, in The Crisis in Tax Administration 124, 138 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2004); Chetty et al., note 60, at 1173; Finkelstein, note 61, at 981; Galle, note 6, at 80;
Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 Colum. J. Tax
L. 218, 244-47 (2010); Schenk, note 16, at 276 n.101.
92 Goldin, note 7, at 286.
9 Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 71.
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1. Low Salience Sticks, No Price Adjustment
For Goldin, revenue is the key to the possible efficiency of a low-
salience stick, even if its price is not adjusted to account for salience
effects.94 Recall that raising revenue through sticks can be less distor-
tionary than many other forms of tax. Take the carbon tax example.
Imagine a carbon tax priced so that each consumer paid exactly the
marginal social damage she inflicted by consuming each unit of car-
bon. This money is then used to replace the corporate income tax.
The corporate income tax is a highly distortive tax-that is, it pro-
duces a lot of deadweight loss because it changes many forms of be-
havior, ranging from entities' decisions about when and how to do
business to the labor supply of the workers whose salaries may be
impacted by it.95 If governments replace a highly inefficient revenue
source, such as the corporate income tax, with sticks, their economies
should expand, a result that is well-known in the carbon tax
literature. 96
94 Goldin, note 7, at 286-87. In contrast, Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky explicitly
omit revenue considerations, and so reach considerably different results. Allcott et al.,
note 7, at 10 & n.5.
95 For extended discussion, see Alan J. Auerbach, Taxation and Corporate Financial Pol-
icy, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1251, 1266-87 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feld-
stein eds., 2002).
96 The environmental economics literature now suggests that carbon taxes may not pro-
duce this kind of efficiency gain if they are used to replace income taxes or other kinds of
consumption taxes. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of
Distorting Taxes, 19 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 603, 604-10 (2000), provides an accessible
overview; for a more technical discussion, see A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder,
Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics, note 95, at
1471, 1483-513. In essence, critics of this "revenue recycling" or "double dividend" argu-
ment say that the distortionary effect of a carbon tax is equivalent to that of any other sales
tax. By reducing the bundle of goods workers can buy with their labor, it may affect work-
ers' decisions about how hard to work. It also may change their decision about which
product to buy from the more-polluting to the less-polluting good. To be sure, this change
is on net socially desirable, but we still must account for the fact that the buyer's own
preferences have been foiled, which is a form of deadweight loss. Still, even the strongest
critics appear to concede that externalities aside, the carbon tax is on net less distortive
than corporate income taxes. Cf. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra, at 1507 (claiming that
environmental taxes may be more efficient than taxes on capital income). Since every
important polluting nation has a corporate income tax, these opportunities for what I call
revenue gains should be widely available. See Bennear & Stavins, note 50, at 116-17 (stat-
ing that the combination of a Pigouvian tax with a reduction in the most-distortive other
tax sources is the most efficient policy).
Alternately, governments may make additional investments with their new stick reve-
nues. If governments were perfectly rational investors, the use of a relatively inefficient
tax might imply that government had some quite valuable investment opportunities availa-
ble. That is, if government is willing to use a very costly revenue source for investing in
public projects, those projects must have a very high payoff. Access to a new source of
much cheaper revenue implies that the government could make profitable additional in-
vestments at that high payoff rate, or at least in a series of investments between that point
and the point corresponding to the cost of stick funds on their investment-returns curve.
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It might also be argued in defense of Goldin's position that hidden
sticks have a lesser effect on labor/leisure decisions than the revenues
they replace. Economists generally assume that consumption taxes
can discourage work, on the theory that what motivates us to get out
of bed is the purchasing power our labor buys us. 9 7 Consumption
taxes (or other changes in the price of a product, such as a stick) re-
duce purchasing power and therefore diminish the incentive to work.
Price instruments with a low market salience may diminish this ef-
fect-or, conceivably, some instruments could have full salience when
it comes to the choice among different consumption items, but have
reduced salience as to the labor/leisure decision.98 One could call this
extra dimension "labor/leisure salience," although it is really still just a
subspecies of market salience.
Low-salience sticks can be efficient to the extent that they facilitate
this exchange of inefficient tax revenue for more-efficient stick reve-
nue.99 Externality producers who fail to notice the stick still must pay
it. For example, assume that the marginal social damage of widget
consumption is $100, and that the corresponding carbon tax on wid-
But of course public choice and similar economic analyses of government decisionmaking
suggest that the rational investor model likely does not capture how governments plan.
9 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 53, at 55-56, 80-81. Differences in administrative and compli-
ance costs may drive a wedge between the behavioral responses to income and consump-
tion taxes, however. See Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the
Government? The Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 251 passim (2008).
98 To suggest one causal mechanism for this difference, suppose that it does not occur to
workers that consumption taxes should affect their work incentives. For evidence, see
Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle & Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Consumption Taxes
Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods, 56
Eur. Econ. Rev. 1200, 1206 (2012). Another possibility is that cognitive effort has different
effects on sellers of labor and purchasers of goods. See Andrew Hayashi, Brent K.
Nakamura & David Gamage, Experimental Evidence of Tax Salience and the Labor-
Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or Complexity?, 41 Pub. Fin. Rev. 203, 217
(2013).
99 In later models, I represent the size of this effect by the formula Tw(Dc - Dr), that is
the product of T, the tax collected per unit of externality, times the number of units pro-
duced at equilibrium (widgets, w), times the difference in deadweight loss between the
carbon tax and the revenue source it replaces. Note that w is not the number of units of
carbon removed from the atmosphere, but instead the number of units produced. On the
graph, that is the difference between quantity at equilibrium and quantity at the far right-
hand side of the graph, where further reductions in carbon are no longer possible. One can
think of this right-hand bound as being the first widget that rolls off the production line; W
cannot buy fewer than zero widgets.
In this simple model, each widget produces one unit of carbon, so that w is equal to both
the number of widgets and the number of units of carbon. More complex models can add
an additional term for the number of units of carbon per widget.
For simplicity, I also assume throughout that the cost function of each producer is identi-
cal, and that the amount of revenues collected from the Pigouvian tax is small relative to
the economy, such that the deadweight loss of each revenue source is effectively invarying.
Finally, I assume a "closed" economy in which tax rates do not affect the flow of invest-
ments into or out of the country.
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gets is $100 per widget. W, a widget consumer, realizes a $60 utility
premium per widget absent the tax. Now suppose W is not that atten-
tive to the tax; he perceives only 50% of the actual tax rate-or, ac-
cording to my earlier terminology, has 0 equal to 0.5. Since W thinks
he will achieve a net premium of $10 after tax, he buys the widget.
That decision results in $100 in revenue that the government would
not have earned if the tax were fully salient.100
Though he notes that Pigouvian taxes should be more salient than
those intended only to raise revenue, Goldin does not focus closely on
the possibility that social damage from the resulting additional pro-
duction of the externality could exceed any revenue gains. 01 That is
unlikely for the very first few units of overproduction. Consider the
graph in Figure 2. The graph looks much like Figure 1, which was the
graphical representation of the idea that the per-unit tax, T, should be
set at the price point where the cost of avoiding negative externalities
and the social gains from avoiding them intersect, the "equilibrium."
But consumers do not respond fully to the tax; they act instead as if
the tax were a lower price, OT. As a result, society produces too much
carbon, with a net utility loss equal to area of the triangle, ABC.
Goldin's revenue story is therefore most plausible for units very
close to point A. Take Marge the marginal producer just to the left of
A, whose widget surplus is $99. If Marge thinks the tax is less than
$99, she sells a widget. Society loses the equivalent of $1 in utility
from that sale: Marge gains $99, but her neighbors lose $100. At the
same time, Marge pays $100 in taxes. Government reduces its other
revenues by $100. What are the savings from that? It depends on the
deadweight loss of existing revenue sources. Estimates of the average
deadweight loss of U.S. taxation run about 50% at their high end,
though some research suggests the number may be rather lower or
100 This example shows that the revenue impact in Goldin's model results from increas-
ing the tax base beyond w. W pays tax not on all widgets that could be built, but instead
only those that are actually built-widgets where the price of mitigating the externality
(which one can also think of as the manufacturer's lost profit from not producing the wid-
get, see Kaplow & Shavell, note 34, at 3 n.2) is greater than the perceived cost of the tax.
In Figure 2, these are the widgets extending rightwards to the far-right bound from the
intersection of OT and the marginal cost line. As 0 increases, this point shifts farther left,
increasing the number of widgets produced and hence subject to tax. The number of wid-
gets that are subject to tax as a result of the lower salience is the widgets sold between OT
and the old equilibrium point. One can therefore calculate the resulting revenue gain by
computing the revenue benefits of taxing that number of new widgets. Using a standard
quantity function, one can calculate that number readily enough, given the slope of that
line, Pc, and the knowledge that cost at the two end points of the line is T and O, respec-
tively. Thus the sum will be (T - O7)Ipc.
101 See Goldin, note 7, at 286-87.
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higher.102 It is too simple to say that society's utility gain is just 50%
times $100; the $100 stick may also have created other distortions not
seen in this picture, such as its potential effect on Marge's incentives
to start a business and work hard at building it. But assuming that the
difference between the deadweight loss of the stick and the tax it re-
places is more than about 1% (on these assumptions), society has
come out ahead. That is the "revenue effect" of low salience.
At some point the losses from excess production are going to ex-
ceed these revenue gains.103 Take Ginny, Marge's cousin, who is close
102 See Charles L. Ballard, John B. Shoven & John Whalley, General Equilibrium Com-
putations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 Am. Econ. Rev.
128, 128 (1985). For estimates implying higher and lower averages, see Martin Feldstein,
Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 674, 678
(1999); Austan Goolsbee, Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of
Tax Reform, 2 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 1, 5-6, 13 (1999); Austan Goolsbee,
Taxes, Organizational Form, and the Deadweight Loss of the Corporate Income Tax, 69 J.
Pub. Econ. 143, 150 (1998). For discussion of Feldstein's methodology, see Raj Chetty, Is
the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications
of Evasion and Avoidance, Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y, Aug. 2009, at 31 passim.
103 In simple math terms, U = T - (Dc - Dr) - Du (Dc - Dr) - Du. That is, net
utility from the low-salience tax (re at fe to the full-salience equilibrium) is equal to reve-
nue gains less deadweight losses of underproduction, Du. But this equation is not very
edifying. Since Du is just a triangle on the graph, one can derive Du as a function of basic
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to point C on the figure. Ginny has a 0 of 0.5, and she realizes a $51
surplus per widget. She, too, pays the carbon tax, because she thinks
it is only $50. Extra carbon production from that decision costs soci-
ety $49 worth of utility: $100 in damage less her $51 profit. And it
brings in $100 in new revenues. But now, the deadweight loss split
between the carbon tax and the corporate tax must be at least $49 for
this to be on net a social gain. Therefore it is unclear whether by itself
low salience benefits society overall. Losses at the left side of the
curve (close to point C in Figure 2) may or may not outweigh gains
closer to equilibrium. The steeper the two lines, and the larger the 0
discount, the more likely it is that losses will outweigh gains.
One other note to keep in mind is that my analysis omits complete
consideration of the costs of consumer mistakes. Again, when taxes
are hidden economic actors may pay more for goods than they expect,
and this may mean that ultimately they end up with a different basket
of purchases than they would have chosen under full information. 104
But as I mentioned before, this is in part an error of budgeting: That
is, it depends to some extent on income effects. 05 Thus we will have
parameters, such as the slopes of the marginal cost (Pc) and social marginal damage curves
(fid), and of 0, through a bit of geometry and algebra (or, more generally, by taking the
integral of the difference between the two lines and evaluating the result at our two end
points). Ultimately, it is a slightly unsi htly result,
U = T ( fC)(Dc 
-Dr) - (82 -20 +1) +2- 28+ 1)
This equation also confirms Goldin's result that the optimal salience can be less than full,
assuming that there are some utility gains from revenue replacement. The first derivative
T22 8 3  fd
with respect to 0 will be -(Dc - Dr) -+ 9 - 1. The second derivative
is strictly negative, so setting the first derivative equal to zero to find the optimal 0 yields:
0 a .fc(Dc - Dr) + c
d + flc (fa + fc) fd + #c
Assuming Dc > D,, this implies that 0' is between zero and one under many plausible
parameters-for example, if the slope of the cost line is 2 and the slope of the damage line
is 0.5, then 0 - 0.6 - 0.2(D, - D,).
10 See Chetty et al., note 60, at 1170-74.
105 See id.; Goldin, note 7, at 276-77. Though Goldin acknowledges this point, his model
appears to assume that the income and substitution effects of goods will be equally salient.
If one holds household income constant, consumers may still lose through substitution
effects, as when Ginny pays the carbon tax instead of buying a good without tax. See
Goldin & Homonoff, note 62, at 307-10.
For modeling purposes, I allow for the impact of substitution effects on consumer wel-
fare by treating the term D, as being fixed at the amount of distortion that would be caused
by the full price of the stick, rather than the discounted price perceived by the consumer.
By assumption, deadweight loss is the amount a rational consumer and her trading part-
ners lose when tax shifts the consumer to her next-preferred option. That same cost, then,
is the largest loss that might be experienced by the consumer and her counter-parties if low
salience leads her to choose the taxed good instead of the next-best option.
to defer full consideration of these mistakes to Section III.C.1 on in-
come effects.
2. Low Salience Sticks with Price Gross-Up
Like Goldin, Gamage and Shanske also argue that low-salience
taxes can be efficient, but they suggest that the government will need
to increase taxes to achieve that result.106 Again, revenue effects are
the key. Gamage and Shanske suggest that price instrument rates can
be adjusted-what I call "grossed up"-by, say, a factor of 1/0, to off-
set any salience effects on the optimal level of negative externality
produced.o'07 If 0 equals 0.5, then rates should be doubled. The offset-
ting shift is actually more efficient than full salience, they claim, be-
cause it multiplies the low-deadweight loss revenues derived from the
stick.108 For example, given marginal social damage of $100, we would
rather have a $100 stick with taxpayers' 0 equal to 0.5 than a $50 stick
with 0 equal to 1. Both result in the exact same amount of externality
produced. But the higher-priced stick brings in twice as much in low-
distortion revenues (assuming away income effects). Therefore, un-
like the scenario in which the stick's rate is not adjusted, there is no
deadweight loss from excess production of the negative externality.109
Gamage and Shanske acknowledge but do not fully explore some
important limits on their result. For one, as they note, the salience of
a tax very likely varies among taxpayers." 0 In some settings this het-
erogeneity implies that offsetting adjustments are not optimal.1" For
example, suppose there are two groups of taxpayers, "sophisticates"
with 0 equal to 1 and "nafves" with 0 equal to 0.5. If both face the
same stick price, and policymakers increase that price to fully deter
naives, the sophisticates will be overdeterred. Consider Figure 3.
106 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 71-74.
107 Id. at 72-73; see also Allcott et al., note 7, at 85 ("[W]hen the average marginal con-
sumer undervalues energy efficiency," increasing an energy tax yields "higher welfare gains
... than would be expected in the externality-only case.").
108 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 72-73.
109 See id. at 72-73.
110 See id. at 77.
111 See Allcott et al., note 7, at 87 (analyzing implications of heterogeneous undervalua-
tion for optimal energy tax policy).
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FIGURE 3
PIGoUvIAN TAX, PARTIAL SALIENCE, FULL GROSS-UP,
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In this diagram, the government is imposing a carbon tax that is
grossed up to fully offset the lowest salience in the population. In
other words, even Ginny, with 0 equal to 0.5, will perceive the tax as
costing her $100. That means the real tax is 1/0 times $100, or $200
per widget. Suppose we have another widget consumer, Maxwell, who
is sophisticated enough to recognize the real price. Even if Maxwell
could earn $199 in profit by purchasing a widget, he will not, because
that would also cost him $200. When Maxwell decides to halt widget
consumption, society loses. It does gain $100 from reduced carbon
emissions. But it also loses Maxwell's $199 profit. So there is a net
$99 deadweight loss. The sum of these losses, from Maxwell and his
smart friends, is the triangle CDE.112
112 One can represent the offsetting revenue effects and overproduction losses with an
equation similar to the equation earlier. Here, the increased tax will be paid on every
widget sold by the producer (that is, on every unit of carbon produced). So set gains from
new revenues as 1-nw (D, - D,), where w is simply the number of widgets sold at equilib-
rium. But this tax is only paid by naive taxpayers. So weight it by P., the naive population.
The losses from overdeterring emissions will similarly be weighted by the sophisticate pop-
ulation, P,. Using the same geometry techniques employed to determine the area of the
deadweight loss triangle for undermitigation, one can find the area of the deadweight loss
triangle of overmitigation. Putting these together yields:
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Gross-up also costs the government some revenue in a world with
sophisticated taxpayers. Consider Maxwell again. If the carbon tax
were $100, and Maxwell's costs of mitigating carbon in his widgets
were above $100, Maxwell would emit the carbon and pay the tax.
But if the tax is $200, and his cost of mitigating is, say, $199, he will
eliminate the carbon and avoid the tax. Thus the government loses
revenues, relative to a full-salience world, on the widgets for which the
cost of mitigating falls between T and r.113 By raising the tax rate,
government also increases the distortiveness of the stick for sophisti-
cates who perceive the higher grossed-up price, diminishing the dead-
weight-loss savings of the resulting stick revenues. 114
It appears that in many instances low salience with gross-up pro-
duces greater social welfare than a fully salient stick."15 For instance,
if there are many naive taxpayers for each sophisticate, the revenue
effects of the gross-up could significantly outweigh the loss from any
overproduction. It is less clear whether grossing up a low-salience
stick is superior to simply allowing the salience to remain low. While
there are revenue losses among sophisticates from gross-up, the reve-
nue effect from raising the tax paid by naives can be several multiples
of the revenue effect from low salience alone.
The relative sizes of the losses from missing the optimal amount of
pollution are also important inputs in evaluating the comparative mer-
its of the two approaches. In Goldin's model, producers emit too
much carbon,116 while in Gamage and Shanske's plan, they mitigate
too much, producing a less-than-optimal amount of pollution." 7 Stan-
It is worth noting that the size of the deadweight loss triangle here is bounded on the
right by the maximum possible reduction. At some point, producers have eliminated all
externalities, or taxes have risen so high that no widgets can be sold profitably, and produc-
ers go bankrupt.
113 One can add this revenue loss to the earlier equation. As before, one can calculate
the quantity of widgets that fall in between two points using the standard quantity formula,
the slope of the cost curve, and the knowledge that the cost at the two end points must be
T and Ir. That calculation yields a quantity equal to -)/pc. To find the total utility cost
of the lost revenue, one then would weight that quantity by the sophisticate population and
multiply by the utility cost of forgone replacement revenue, P - z)/c) (Dc - Dr),.
114 Gross up also increases the welfare loss for consumers who make poor choices. As
before, the upper bound of that welfare loss can be captured by the deadweight loss for the
full tax price, D,.
115 Adding together with the earlier formulae:
=P T(Dc-)Dr) -s 
- + 1
116 See Goldin, note 7, at 286.
117 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 73.
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dard economic theory suggests that this latter case, overmitigation,
typically produces bigger deadweight losses."i8 According to that the-
ory, price instruments are most preferable to other tools when the
marginal social damage curve is fairly flat: Each additional unit of the
public bad is not much more harmful than the one before.119 That
suggests that when we are using price instruments, overdeterrence is
usually the more serious concern.120 It is worth keeping in mind,
though, that with gross-up only sophisticates overmitigate, while with
no gross-up there is excess pollution from all naives.
In short, there are good reasons to think that in some situations full
gross-up is a better option. But, as I now show, these are not the only
two choices.
3. Low Salience Sticks with Partial Gross-Up
Although fully grossing up stick prices to account for low salience is
intuitive, government can choose many other pricing strategies. In-
deed, as Gamage and Shanske acknowledge, in some cases political
opposition to a stick will constrain its price below the value that would
fully incentivize naive producers.121 Government can set the price of
118 See, e.g., Hepburn, note 11, at 231-32.
119 The typical reason offered in the literature for preferring price instruments is that we
think the risk of excess cost is greater than the risk of excess externalities. See, e.g., Hel-
fand et al., note 28, at 279; cf. Stavins, note 34, at 889 (concluding that, "if marginal abate-
ment costs are flat relative to marginal benefits, then a quantity instrument is more
efficient than a price instrument"). When the marginal social damage curve is flat, we
prefer to avoid overdeterrence, since the cost of avoiding each additional unit typically
rises, but the benefits of avoiding that unit are not changing much. Therefore, if observing
that officials have chosen a price instrument, one might reasonably conclude that they
believe the marginal social damage curve is fairly flat. Kaplow & Shavell, note 34, at 7-10,
argue that taxes can account for this possibility, if the tax rate is allowed to vary across
taxpayers or over time. But Bennear and Stavins argue that firm responses to government
policy occur over long periods, such that frequent policy changes may be unrealistic. Ben-
near & Stavins, note 50, at 122. They suggest in that situation that a combination of price
and quantity instruments might be optimal regardless of the shape of the marginal social
damage curve. See id.
Another argument for price instruments arises if the combination of quantity regulation
plus tradable permits is not possible. For example, pollutants that are more harmful when
concentrated in one place, such as mercury, are usually not good candidates for trading
regimes. In those instances the mere fact that officials have chosen a price instrument
regime would not tell us much about the slope of the marginal social damage curve.
120 See Sterner, note 4, at 212. Again, Kaplow & Shavell, note 34, at 7-10, argue that the
costs of overdeterrence could be mitigated with flexible tax rate schedules. If that were the
case, could impose lower taxes on sophisticates to avoid some of the costs of grossing up.
But this would require the government to be able to identify sophisticated taxpayers. As
Kaplow and Shavell implicitly acknowledge, when rates vary according to observable char-
acteristics of the taxpayer, there are often opportunities for strategic behavior, which will
tend to diminish the efficacy of any flexible schedule. Id. at 6 n.7.
121 See Gamage & Shanske, note 7, at 73.
a stick at any multiple of 0, though the most logical values are proba-
bly partial gross-ups, such that the price falls somewhere between one
and 1/0 times the marginal social damage. So, for instance, if naive
producers have 0 equal to 0.5, and marginal social damage is $100, the
government might set its stick price at $150, rather than the $200 per
unit that would cause naives to fully internalize their carbon damage.
I argue that, rather than a bug, this result actually would be a feature:
Partial gross-up is likely to be more efficient than other responses to
low salience.
Though the math here is a bit messy, the intuition in favor of partial
gross-up is straightforward and familiar to most readers acquainted
with tax policy. If government does not set the stick price high
enough to cause a naive producer to fully internalize her externalities,
she will overproduce them.122 At the same time, by lowering the tax
price facing sophisticates, government reduces the extent to which
they work too hard to reduce externalities.123
In other words, partial gross-up reduces one distortion at the cost of
increasing another. Why would that be helpful? The deadweight loss
of each distortion bears an exponential relationship to the size of the
distortion.124 That means that the total loss from two small distortions
of size X will be much less than the lost utility caused by a single
distortion of size 2X. In the case of the carbon tax example, reducing
gross-up allows one to shave off the biggest piece of the overdeter-
rence deadweight loss triangle in exchange for a much smaller new
triangle, as illustrated in Figure 4.
122 Recall the earlier equation in which the deadweight loss of underdeterrence was
given as ) (92-29 + 1+ -2+) + 6 - 20 + 1). Now let x represent some
adjustment in the degree of gr ss-up, such that the tax imposed is
1-x
0 r. The area of the resulting underdeterrence deadweight loss triangle can then be
given as: XT (5l XT + xT
123 Again, using simple geometry and algebra, one can calculate the resulting dead-
weight loss. If x is the adjustment in the degree of gross-up, such that the tax imposed is
0 T, then deadweight loss of overdeterrence is. L (XT + xt
124 Chetty et al., note 60, at 1173.
78 [Vol. 67:TAX LAW REVIEW
2013] CARROTS, STICKS, AND SALIENCE 79
FIGURE 4
PIGOUVIAN TAX, PARTIAL SALIENCE, PARTIAL GROSS-UP,
HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCERS
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Admittedly, there is considerably more complexity in the problem
than is captured in this simple intuition. Most importantly, by reduc-
ing gross-up, we also potentially diminish the revenue collected by the
tax. There are two offsetting revenue effects. For one, we are reduc-
ing the amount of tax collected on each unit of carbon. But, at the
same time, since naive producers are no longer fully deterred, they
will now produce more taxable units of carbon than at the full gross-
up equilibrium. 125 For example, if Ginny, with 0 equal to 0.5, faced a
tax of 1/0 times the marginal social damage of $100, she would pro-
duce no widgets where the costs of eliminating carbon were more than
$100. But if the price is only $150 per unit, she will perceive the per-
unit tax as $75. She then will produce widgets for which it would cost
her between $75 and $100 to eliminate the carbon, and she will pay
tax of $150 on each of those widgets. Similarly, sophisticated produc-
ers will also produce more widgets because the tax cost of doing so has
15 Under full gross-up nalive producers produce widgets at the full-salience equilibrium
amount, so this change in quantity is also the change relative to full salience. Relative to
either equilibrium, then, partial gross-up to a tax of 1 - x/ increases the number of units
produced by & ), with welfare effects P,, ) (Dc - Dr)
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declined. 126 In other words, partial gross-up lowers rates but expands
the tax base relative to full gross-up.127
Overall, intuition suggests that the beneficial effects of reducing to-
tal externality-related costs-relative to the costs under full or no
gross-up-should dominate any sacrifice from diminished revenues. 28
While both quantities may depend on exponential functions of the
tax rate, lost revenues from declining rates are partly offset by reve-
nues from an expanding base. Lower rates also reduce the distortive-
ness of the stick, improving its per-dollar deadweight loss gains over a
corporate tax. Thus, where externality-related costs are large, reduc-
ing the stick price from full to partial gross-up should tend to improve
welfare. If there are many more naive producers than sophisticates
this gain will be muted, however. As government continues to reduce
the tax rate, the benefits from cutting externality costs further become
small relative to the possibility of revenue gains, and so there is plausi-
bly an optimal price falling somewhere between marginal social dam-
age and 1/0 times that amount.129
126 Among sophisticates, the change in quantity from gross-up to partial gross-up is
P 
'
127 Overall, as x increases the total change in revenue relative to full gross-up can be
given as the sum of the contending revenue effects:
128 Building on earlier equations, and including an additional term for underdeterrence,
the net utility of a partially grossed-up tax, relative to a full-salience equilibrium, can be
given as:
U = P Trw(Dc - Dr)) + Pn X T (Dc - D,)
(T2 2-2x+1 2-2x X2-2x+1 2-2x
Ts((TXTOT)/flc) (D'C(_LT fd+
-Ps /(c (D - Dr - Pn fl fXT + XT)).
In this equation, the first two terms represent, respectively, the revenue effects of raising
the tax rate and broadening the base. The next term captures the losses from overdeter-
ring sophisticates, and the fourth term captures revenues lost from sophisticates who miti-
gate rather than paying the higher tax. The final term captures residual deadweight loss
from naive producers who are not fully deterred by the partially salient stick.
Note that because the two curves are bounded to the left and right by full and zero
emissions, respectively, it is also possible that there will be corner solutions in which the
expected deadweight loss is truncated. In these situations partial gross-up may no longer
be optimal.
129 To test this mathematically, one can treat 0 as a parameter and attempt to find an
aU
optimal x (reduction in gross-up ratio) given any 0. By taking Tin the equation in note
128 (and noting that the second derivative is strictly negative), setting that result equal to
zero, and solving for x, one can, after a great deal of algebra, conclude that:
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A very similar approach, and one that is not mutually exclusive with
partial gross-up, would be for government to combine gross-up with
attempts to change the salience of its stick. If government succeeds in
making the stick more salient, it will diminish its need to gross up the
price of the stick. That means it will collect less revenue from naive
producers. At the same time, it will distort the incentives of sophisti-
cated producers by a smaller amount than it would if i/8 were larger.
In short, the math of adjusting salience looks quite similar to partial
gross-ups. This equivalence allows the government to choose the
technique or combination of techniques that are best achievable with
current salience-altering technologies and within existing political con-
straints on tax rates.
Partial gross-up or adjusted salience also is flexible enough to adapt
to even greater heterogeneity in the population than I have consid-
ered so far. Realistically, the population will not be neatly divided
into naive and sophisticated producers, but instead will likely include
individuals with a range of e values. My analysis here suggests that it
will usually not be ideal for government to set tax rates so as to opti-
mize the response of the most nalfve individuals, but instead to allow
some underproduction by those producers.
Despite these caveats, I agree with the central findings of Gamage
& Shanske and Goldin that low salience can be efficient even for
Pigouvian taxes. Further adjustments to the design or rate of the
stick, however, may achieve even more efficient outcomes than they
suggest. As shown below, including income effects in the mix may
also add some important wrinkles.
B. Extension I: Charitable Contributions and Other
Positive Externalities
So far I have focused, as price-instrument theorists traditionally
have, on the use of Pigouvian pricing to control negative externalities.
How much of that discussion would also apply to positive externali-
ties? For instance, consider credit-hours of education. These credit-
hours benefit not only the purchaser, but also future employers (think
of the law firm that need not train its first-year associates to do the
x2
x > 0 iff > Tw,
where w again is the number of units of the polluting good produced at equilibrium. That
quantity can be restated as w TQmx, where a is the y-intercept of the cost
curve, and Q, is the quantity produced with no reduction in emissions (in essence, the
intercept of the cost curve and the right-hand side of the diagram). Therefore, assuming
that a is greater than or equal to zero (and that 7, which is a per-unit quantity rather than a
tax rate, is greater than 1), x is strictly positive. Q.E.D.
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tasks law school has prepared graduates to do) and society as a whole.
What if we imposed a penalty on young people who skip college? 30
Or, less hypothetically, what if there were a fee imposed on individu-
als above a certain income threshold who fail to obtain health
insurance?131
1. Positive Externalities and Sticks
Flipping the externalities government targets from negative to posi-
tive should not change the low-salience analysis I have done so far. In
one sense, semantics are all that separate positive externalities from
negative. We can describe the actions we want our widget producers
to undertake either as cutting their negative-externality production, or
instead as increasing a new positive externality, pollution reduction.
Either way, the marginal social gains from an additional unit of pollu-
tion taken out of the atmosphere would be the same. The same for
education: With each hour of education bought or not, a student con-
tributes either to a well-educated population (positive externality) or
to an ignorant one (negative).
As I argued earlier, though, in their archetypical cases positive and
negative externalities differ in their relation to the status quo.132 To
produce more positive externalities, society usually has to build more
"stuff": hospitals, research labs. To reduce negative externalities, it
must diminish something, such as a polluting industrial process, or
traffic, or cigarettes consumed. This divergence between "more stuff"
and "less stuff" informs my discussion of income effects. It also af-
fects government's ability to solve private market failures directly.
As Emmanuel Saez explains, government can respond to private
overproduction of some public good by reducing its own output. 3 3
His example is charitable contributions.134 If donors give too much to
charity, government can either reduce its subsidy for charity, or in-
stead simply produce fewer of the goods that government produces in
common with the charitable sector. If there are too many private
130 If this seems politically infeasible, consider that education deferments from the draft
during the Vietnam War were similar in structure to the fee I just mentioned: They im-
posed higher costs, albeit non-monetary costs, on a cohort of young people who chose not
to attend college. Whether the fact that the costs were nonmonetary should change the
normative analysis of them is a complicated question I leave for elsewhere. See Brian
Galle, Tax, Command... Or Nudge? Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 837
(2014).
131 See IRC § 5000A(b)(1).
132 See text accompanying notes 56-57.
133 See Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal Treatment of Tax Expenditures, 88 J. Pub. Econ.
2657, 2659 (2004).
134 Id. at 2660.
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schools, government could reduce investment in public schools. Thus,
Saez argues, government can use its own output to adjust for imper-
fectly-targeted subsidies for charity.135 In some cases this second in-
strument will allow government to obtain better results than using the
price instrument alone.
Saez's analysis implies that it is easier for government to correct
overproduction of the archetypical positive externality than it is to do
the same for overdeterrence of the classic negative externality. Gov-
ernment does not produce lower cigarette consumption. If sticks
aimed at curtailing smoking are priced too high, there is no obvious
government output that can be lowered in response.136
The upshot of this analysis is that the carrot and stick cases may not
be perfectly symmetrical. Grossing up sticks typically results in over-
incentivizing sophisticates. If government has other mechanisms
available to offset this effect, its impact can be mitigated, potentially
increasing the appeal of Gamage & Shanske's proposal. Saez's theory
suggests that possibility is more plausible for most positive
externalities.
2. Positive Externalities and Inefficient Carrots
In any event, it is unusual in our society to use sticks to encourage
positive externalities. Politics and law contribute to that outcome, as I
have explained elsewhere.137 It is also the case that sometimes carrots
are more efficient, usually because of income effects. If the socially
desirable outcome requires the producer to buy something-which we
typically observe in the positive-externality case-we often want her
to have more money, so that she will want and be able to afford more
of it. As I explained previously,138 that is likely the best argument for
why subsidizing donations to schools is a better way to educate the
public than penalizing people who skip class or refuse to donate.139
What then are the effects of low salience on, say, the charitable contri-
bution deduction?
135 Id. at 2667.
136 To the extent that government does currently subsidize some tobacco production, it
could reduce that subsidy, but in my analysis reducing a subsidy is the equivalent of a stick.
In addition, governments may also use nonprice tools such as indoor smoking bans to re-
duce tobacco consumption. If these exist alongside the price instrument, then potentially
government has flexibility similar to that which it has when directly producing the good.
137 E.g., Galle, note 4, at 840-45.
138 See Section II.B.
139 See Galle, note 4, at 832-38.
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Perhaps counter-intuitively, in many settings low-salience carrots
could be superior to their more visible counterparts.140 One reason,
as for sticks, is that lower salience potentially improves the revenue
effects of the price instrument: If individuals perceive the reward of
the carrot as too low to motivate them, the government does not need
to pay out. As I mentioned earlier,'141 carrots also carry other welfare
costs, as well, including the likelihood that they will encourage future
bad acts, or crowd out future good acts, by producers.142 To be sure,
diminishing the salience of the carrot may cause over- or under-pro-
duction of externalities in the short run. But especially in the case of
negative externalities, it is quite possible that the optimal salience of
the carrot is zero. That is, in some situations it would be better for
society if the carrot had no effect than for society to continue to pay
for the effects the carrot currently produces.
At first glance this is a puzzle: Why would government want an
instrument it enacted to be invisible to the public? One answer, as I
explore below' 4 3 , is that the instrument might only be hidden from
some actors, and this partial salience could be more effective than full
salience. But even where that is not the case, salience could poten-
tially be a second-best solution to political failures. Carrots, again, are
often the product of defective politics and unfortunate legal doctrine.
Because carrots usually embody a transfer of wealth from all taxpay-
ers to a small, relatively cohesive group (the externality producers),
lobbying and policy decentralization both tend to favor carrots.
Alternately, the carrot might have been enacted at a time when the
consequences of that decision were not fully understood. With the
passage of time, society regrets its decision, but the subsidy now is too
politically entrenched for repeal. Lowered salience at least would di-
minish the ongoing cost of the locked-in error. The home mortgage
interest deduction provides one possible example.
Salience could allow an actor who is less subject to political pres-
sures to partially remedy the bad decisions of another. Many actors
can influence the impact of a price instrument, including different
branches and tiers of government. Thus federal policy might-per-
140 See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 48-49 (2006) (argu-
ing that inefficient subsidies should be targeted to actors whose behavior is the least elas-
tic); cf. Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 674, 674-77 (1999) (arguing that tax avoidance may improve welfare if
the income tax system has many inefficient subsidies). But cf. Stavins, note 34, at 889
(noting that eliminating subsidies for inefficient behavior may be the best current approach
to pollution abatement). .
141 See Section II.B.
142 Galle, note 4, at 833-36.
143 See Section III.E.
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haps in combination with private third parties-use salience to soften
the costs of carrots created by states, or the executive branch could
diminish the appeal of congressional giveaways. I do not mean to sug-
gest that this combination of events is necessarily intentional; public
choice factors and low salience may accidentally combine to mitigate
the damage from carrot overgrowth. Federal efforts to encourage
homeowners to refinance their underwater homes appear to be, for
good or ill, a recent example. Banks have apparently tried to make
the program as opaque as possible, and relevant federal regulators do
not seem to have pushed for greater transparency.144
3. Positive Externalities and Efficient Carrots
Not all carrots would be better off hidden under the rug. There are
some decent arguments that the charitable contribution deduction, for
example, is a better choice than penalizing the selfish.145 But there is
also some evidence that donors are not fully aware of the benefits of
the deduction.146 Should policy makers "gross up" the price of a low-
salience carrot to maintain its substitution effects?
Even in the case where the optimal salience of the carrot is greater
than zero (that is, the carrot is actually good policy), the answer is still
"probably not." Grossing up of course magnifies the revenue costs of
the carrot. To the extent that some producers are more aware of the
carrot than average, an undifferentiated gross-up would wastefully
over-incentivize them, perhaps including their incentives to play
games with future policy. Further, gross-up multiplies the wasteful-
ness of subsidizing inframarginal producers. Gross-up is welfare-im-
proving only to the extent that the benefits of incentivizing marginal
producers exceeds its combined costs.14 7
Again, there is a good chance that partial gross-up would do better.
Though naive producers will not produce at optimal levels, the waste
from over-production by sophisticates is much reduced. The revenue
144 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from
the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52
Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 776-78 (2010).
145 See Galle, note 4, at 839-40.
146 Goldin & Listokin, note 70, at 7-8; see Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does
Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates from Panel Data,
64 Nat'l Tax J. 615, 636 (2011) (suggesting that their results could be explained by varia-
tions in "how salient the price changes" of charitable giving are).
147 Putting this idea in math is a bit misleading, because it implies somewhat more preci-
sion than is actually possible. Several of the important factors in increasing the value of
carrots, such as the waste of funds devoted to inframarginal producers, cannot easily be
modeled in this framework. But as a rough approximation, consider (where T again repre-
sents the amount of the Pigouvian price, which here is the subsidy, and Pb is the slope of
the marginal social benefit curve):
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cost of the subsidy for each unit produced also falls. Once more,
deadweight losses increase exponentially and revenue effects are
mixed. If the naive population is large, intuition suggests that shrink-
ing the losses from underproduction would, to a point, often be worth
any revenue cost.
C. Income and Output Effects
Another extension of my basic results would be to factor in income
effects. Until this point I have assumed away any income effects of
sticks or carrots. I have also ignored the possibility that either instru-
ment might similarly affect the outputs of firms. I remedy that over-
sight here.
1. Individuals and Income Effects
In many cases, but not all, the income effects of a single price instru-
ment will be small relative to its substitution effects. Prior commenta-
tors therefore have largely assumed away income effects, or presumed
that they will be irrelevant if the government bundles them with off-
setting taxes or lump-sum payouts.148 But in some settings income
effects can be quite substantial. For example, analysts estimated that
legislation resembling the carbon-tax bill passed in 2009 by the U.S.
House of Representativesl 49 would have consumed more than 5% of
U= P (92 -2 + 1) + 02 -20 + 1
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What this equation tells us is that the net welfare effect of grossing up carrots to account
for diminished salience reflects the gains from eliminating under-production by nayve pro-
ducers, reduced by the costs of over-incentivizing sophisticates, and also reduced by the
greater costs of subsidies. Subsidy costs increase for each widget produced by the entire
producer population (the penultimate term on the right-hand side), and also increase with
the number of new widgets produced by naive producers (the rightmost term). By assump-
tion, the first term on the right-hand side is greater than the last (that is, the carrots are
worth their cost under full salience), but of course it does not follow that the first term
exceeds all three costs in combination. I consider the impact of income effects in more
detail in Section III.C.
148 See Helfand et al., note 11, at 280; Parry & Oates, note 96, at 604.
149 Actually, the bill established a system of tradable permits whose economic effect was
similar to a carbon tax. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111th Cong.; Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, at 20 (2009). On the economic similarity of cap and trade to a carbon
tax, see Helfand et al., note 28, at 281.
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household income for some poor families.o50 Data also suggest that
very wealthy households frequently hit a 50%-of-income cap on the
deductibility of their charitable contributions, implying that the dollar
value of the deduction for those taxpayers is about 20% of their in-
come.151 Household budget changes of this magnitude warrant some
consideration.
As I showed earlier, income effects do not change the optimal price
of a stick or carrot but do change the amount of externality that is
produced.152 Carrots shift the typical producers' cost curve to the
right, assuming we are dealing with normal goods. Sticks on normal
goods in effect would shift the cost curve leftwards, as producers
would demand fewer units of the good for any given cost. Salience
can interact with these shifts in at least two distinct ways.
First, salience could diminish income effects together with substitu-
tion effects. If households are unaware of the value of their charitable
contribution deduction, they may also miscalculate their after-tax
budget for the year, and therefore assume that their bank balance will
be smaller than their tax refund will show. Yet we often want charita-
ble households to feel wealthier so they will donate more.153 Or, in
the other direction, households that are unaware of the bite a carbon
tax takes out of their budgets may consume more than they would if
the income effect were more salient.154 In both these cases, salience is
dampening a desirable shift in the cost curve. The opposite is also
possible, such as would be the case if we used sticks to encourage
charity.
Second, if income effects are relatively more salient than are substi-
tution effects, they might affect the efficiency analyses discussed
150 See Cong. Budget Office, Trade-Offs in Allocating Allowances for C02 Emissions 2
(2007); Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance
Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 Nat'l Tax J. 199,
212 tbl.4 (2002).
151 Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 165, 172-76 (2008). Admittedly, households that can smooth their income
over time likely behave as though their budget constraint is equal to lifetime rather than
annual income. Therefore the 50% cap may be a rather smaller percentage of wealthy
donors' effective budgets. But many donors hit the cap year after year, id., which suggests
that the income effect of donations is still substantial.
152 See Figure 1 and text accompanying notes 49-53.
153 Once more, government officials typically cannot set subsidy amounts to take accu-
rate account of the income effects of their carrot. At best, they can try to make sure that
income and substitution effects are pointing in the same direction. In that situation, al-
though there is some risk of overproduction, the officials at least can be assured that the
income effects will not totally cancel out the substitution effect of the carrot.
154 Cf. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted
Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Rev. 33, 57-60
(2010) (examining effect of energy-tax salience on energy consumption).
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above. 155 In essence, by shifting the cost curve, income effects can
affect the deadweight loss of under- or over-incentivizing externali-
ties, as Figure 5 illustrates.
FIGURE 5
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This figure illustrates a partially hidden carrot-say, the charitable-
contribution deduction-with fully-salient income effects. 156 As the
cost curve shifts rightwards, the deadweight loss from naive taxpayers,
represented by triangle ABC, expands to the triangle FBG. The
losses that would be produced by grossing up the tax rate to 1/0, as
represented by triangle ADE, instead diminish, becoming new trian-
gle FHE.157 Using a stick instead would produce a leftward shift (not
illustrated), with the opposite impact on the two triangles.
155 See Sections III.A and III.B.
156 For simplicity, I graph the cost-curve shift as though it were identical in magnitude
for all producers. Since we hypothesize that naive producers will pay tax on more units
than sophisticates will, that is probably inaccurate; naive producers will shift more. My
general point is unaffected by this simplification.
157 Lost government revenues from sophisticates, which bear a relationship to the length
of line segment DA, also grow, as lost revenues now are dependent on the length of the
longer segment HF. But, at the same time, revenues that would be produced by leaving
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Figure 5 can also represent the effect of a stick on reduction of the
typical negative externality. Think of households facing a carbon tax.
If they are poorer as a result of the tax, they demand less energy, a
normal good. Therefore at any given price for a unit of carbon, the
household consumes less carbon than in the absence of the tax.
The normative implication here is that the income effect makes
gross-up more appealing for many combinations of externality and in-
strument. By shifting the cost curve rightwards, the income effect of
charitable contribution plus carrot, or of carbon tax plus stick, reduces
the utility lost from increasing the tax rate sophisticates perceive
(from triangle ADE to FHE in Figure 5). In contrast, if government
did not gross up tax rates, and allowed some naive producers to per-
ceive a sub-optimal tax rate, the income effects would worsen the out-
come (from triangle ABC to FBG in Figure 5). Full gross-up may still
not be ideal, but a partial gross-up may be closer to 1/0 than it would
be without income effects. Of course, the opposite is true if govern-
ment targets negative externalities with carrots or targets positive ex-
ternalities with sticks. Government should not gross up a partially
salient "cash for clunkers" program.
To put this point more intuitively, gross-up magnifies the effects of
matching instruments with externalities. The bigger the tax or sub-
sidy, the larger the income effect. If the income effect is working in
the opposite direction from the substitution effect-carrots and nega-
tive externalities, say-the result will tend to be even less efficient if it
is grossed up.
2. Firms and Output Effects
Does any of this analysis apply if the externality producers are firms
rather than people? It might. Firms are governed by humans, 158 and
modern for-profit firms usually pay their managers with a share of
firm profits.159 Taxes and subsidies that affect firm profits therefore
may trigger behavioral responses from managers.160
the tax rate at a (that is, the alternative to gross-up) also drop, because they are related to
the length of segment AC, which would shift to the shorter segment FG. So from a reve-
nue perspective it is ambiguous (without knowing more parameters) whether the shift af-
fects government's choice between the two strategies.
158 But see Terminator 2: Judgment Day (Carolco Pictures, 1991).
159 See e.g., David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation:
Theory and Evidence, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 232,
236-37 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
160 For a review of the arguments that managers can respond irrationally to incentive-
based pay, see Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing In-
centive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. Corp.
L. 53, 72-79 (2012).
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More straightforwardly, the total output of firms in an industry usu-
ally rises and falls with government subsidies or taxation. 161 This
tends to multiply the impact of any price-instrument policy. Though
output effects do not alter the producer's marginal decision about the
externality-producing good, they do change the number of producers
or number of units produced at the margin. As with income effects,
these output effects may affect the trade-offs policymakers face. And
again, gross-up will magnify any price instrument's impact on firm
output.
Salience could also change the output effect. Over time, output ex-
pands in subsidized industries because the government support at-
tracts new investment.162 If entrepreneurs make investment decisions
based on perceived costs and benefits, then output will expand less
than expected in the presence of hidden carrots and expand faster
than expected with hidden sticks. We should also expect a change in
the ratio of naive to sophisticated producers. For instance, if naive
producers are more attracted than their sophisticated comrades to in-
dustries subject to hidden sticks, over time the population of produc-
ers will comprise a greater portion of naives.
It might be argued at this point that salience is largely irrelevant for
firms, for whom market competition should drive low-0 actors out of
business. This presumes, among other things, that there is enough
"smart" money to arbitrage, or bet against, the misguided actors.163
In fact evidence suggests a substantial degree of irrational behavior in
firms. Most relevant for my claims here, many studies now find signif-
icant evidence of overconfidence and other biases among entrepre-
neurs and other investors.'6 More generally, firm managers and their
monitors can never know everything; scholars of managerial behavior
find that "satisficing" and other mental shortcuts are pervasive in
industry.165
161 Sterner, note 4, at 167-70.
162 Id. at 167-68.
163 For an overview of this assumption, see Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In
Praise of Investor Irrationality, in The Law & Economics of Irrational Behavior 542, 549-
57 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
164 See e.g., Malcolm Baker, Richard S. Ruback & Jeffrey Wurgler, Behavioral Corpo-
rate Finance, in 1 Handbook in Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate Finance 145,
171-76 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reporting other studies finding use of simplified finan-
cial assumptions and simplistic targets for borrowing and dividend payouts); Colin
Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach,
89 Am. Econ. Rev. 306, 314-15 (1999); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes
Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. Fin. Econ. 20, 42
(2008).
165 See, e.g., Sydney Finkelstein, Donald C. Hambrick & Bert Cannella, Strategic Lead-
ership: Theory and Research on Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards 43-44
(2009); Raphael Amit & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent,
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D. HyperSalience
Now flip the salience lever from low to high. Just as full salience for
sticks initially seemed intuitively appealing, it might at first glance
seem as though hypersalient sticks would be especially desirable. Af-
ter all, hypersalience makes the stick even more effective, with less
need for government-imposed penalties. But the problem with a
hypersalient stick is that it entails swapping out real money for
imagined money. Imagined money might motivate externality pro-
ducers, but it does not pay the government's bills. I argue, though,
that in some unusual instances hypersalient sticks may be a decent
second-best option when full-priced sticks are politically unavailable,
and that they may also be useful for producing positive externalities.
1. Sticks
Again, it is the importance of the stick as a source of revenue that
often would make increased salience undesirable. Suppose policy-
makers did not alter the price of the hypersalient stick. If price is
already set at marginal social damage, the increased perceived cost of
the stick will result in over-deterrence. As I showed earlier, it is possi-
ble that over-deterrence could be welfare-increasing-if the govern-
ment were actually collecting revenues from the overcharge.166 But
hypersalience simply produces over-deterrence without bringing in
any new revenues. Indeed, because more producers reduce produc-
tion and so avoid the tax, hypersalience curtails revenues.
Of course, officials could also "gross-down," or adjust the stick's
price downwards to maintain a steady level of deterrence, but that
does not solve the revenue problem. Once more, the deterrence-neu-
tral price is simply 1/0. When 0 > 1, the new price is a fraction of the
old, reducing the revenue collected from each noncompliant producer.
This loss is not offset by the addition of new taxpayers: Since subjec-
tive deterrence among naives is unchanged, the number of noncomp-
liant producers also is unchanged, and therefore revenues decline.
Moreover, any sophisticates would be under-deterred. Partially gross-
ing down may potentially diminish the overall loss, but there are still
few gains to be had.167
Overall hypersalience looks like it typically will be inferior to other
options, but it might still be useful as a second-best choice in some
14 Strategic Mgmt. J. 33, 40 (1993); Sucheta Nadkarni & Pamela S. Barr, Environmental
Context, Managerial Cognition, and Strategic Action: An Integrated View, 29 Strategic
Mgmt. J. 1395, 1397 (2008).
166 See Subsection III.A.1.
167 The net utility of partial gross-down, relative to a full-salience equilibrium, can be
expressed as:
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situations. Most obviously, if the price of a stick is constrained to be
below optimal, but that constraint does not similarly bind efforts to
affect the salience of the stick, hypersalience may produce results
closer to optimal than the full-salience, too-cheap stick. This scenario
seems most likely when the implementation and promotion of the
stick are carried out by separate governmental entities, or when there
are private third-party beneficiaries. For instance, lobbying might
limit Congress' ability to accurately price penalties for nonrenewable
energy sources. But advertising by solar- and wind-energy manufac-
turers might hype the penalty without emphasizing its exceptions.
Similarly, one suspects that once the Affordable Care Act's minimum
coverage provision is in place,168 insurers are unlikely to emphasize its
exceptions for low-income individuals when advising prospective
enrollees.
Hypersalient sticks may also have some added appeal when used to
produce positive externalities (or to deter negative externalities at-
tached to inferior goods). Again, in those settings the income effect of
the stick is working against its desired substitution effect. Hyper-
salience and gross-down allow the real tax price to fall, reducing the
unwanted income effect. Of course, if the income effect of the stick is
also hypersalient, this result is not particularly helpful, so this option
would matter mostly when income effects are less salient than substi-
tution effects.
2. Carrots
In contrast, hypersalient carrots may well be superior to their only
ordinarily-visible cousins. 169 The hypersalient carrot is almost a mir-
II = -P Tw(Dc - D,) - Ps ( (Dc - Dr)
0D x)
(T2 2 f/d\x2-2x+1 2- 2x x'-2x+1 
2-2x
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Notably, all of the terms in the equation are negative. The first three reflect lesser reve-
nues: from the tax collected from all producers; from the fact that, when tax rates are
lowered, there are fewer sophisticated producers who pay tax; and from naives who miti-
gate rather than pay what they perceive as a higher tax. The last two terms are the dead-
weight losses from partial over-deterrence of naives and partial under-deterrence of
sophisticates, respectively.
168 IRC § 5000A.
169 See Faulhaber, note 14, at 1335, 1340 (suggesting that hypersalient tax expenditures
may generate more desirable behavior per dollar forgone by the government).
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ror image of the low-salience stick.170 That is, hypersalient carrots
tend towards efficiency because, if combined with offsetting price ad-
justments, they save government dollars. If the marginal social bene-
fit of another unit of a good is $100, and producers have 0 = 2, the
government can spend just $50 per unit to encourage its production by
the nafve. The government can also spend less on sophisticates, who
are less motivated by the diminished subsidy, though of course this
also means that sophisticates under-produce the beneficial good.171
As I argued earlier, it is likely that the ideal government policy is
not to adjust tax to fully offset hypersalience, but instead to only par-
tially gross-down rates.172 Since producers probably are heterogene-
ous in their perception of the carrot, the optimal price/salience
combination must balance the costs of under-incentivizing sophisti-
cates against any revenue or other savings. It therefore would usually
be preferable for any given average 0 to set the carrot's price at above
marginal social benefit/0. If salience is manipulable by the govern-
ment, some combination of less-than-maximum possible hypersalience
and incomplete gross-down may be better than other options.
In addition, the income effects of the carrot might be only normally
salient. If so, then grossing-down the carrot's price will naturally re-
duce any accompanying income effects, and therefore tend to dimin-
ish its effectiveness in stimulating most kinds of positive externalities.
But tamping down the income effect is actually desirable if carrots are
offered to curtail negative externalities or to encourage the produc-
tion of inferior goods.
Finally on the hypersalience front, many modern carrots, ranging
from deductions for charitable contributions to bonus depreciation for
170 In part cular, one can model the welfare effects of the hypersalient carrot as:(1-x 1-(lx)(
U = P (Tw(D)/ 0 )D (D ( 0))
( t2 ) 2-2x+1 2-2x+ x-2x+1 2-2x l
This equation is very similar to the one presented in footnote 127. In this equation, the
first two terms represent, respectively, the revenue effects of lowering the subsidy rate and
expanding the number of naive claimants of the subsidy. The next term captures the losses
from under-incentivizing sophisticates, and the fourth term captures revenues gained from
sophisticates who are not motivated to produce the good under the lower subsidy rate.
The final term captures any residual deadweight loss from naive producers who might be
over-incentivized if the carrot is not grossed-down fully.
171 In theory, government could correct the over-incentives problem by enacting a non-
linear tax whose rate varied depending on the sophistication of the taxpayer. But such a
tax would face a number of obvious practical difficulties in implementation.
172 See text accompanying notes 121-29.
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domestic industrial productions, are delivered through the Code. 73
Most of these so-called "tax expenditures" operate by reducing taxa-
ble income, not the total tax due.17 4 Therefore in order to make the
value of these carrots hypersalient to taxpayers, someone will have to
make clear the beneficiary's marginal tax rate.'75 But that could have
other unexpected welfare effects. For example, if taxpayers are sensi-
tive to the marginal tax rate when they decide how much labor effort
to expend, magnifying the salience of individuals' marginal rates could
distort work decisions. The impact of this distortion could well exceed
any benefits from the carrot.
E. Correlations
Lastly, I have assumed until now that naives and sophisticates are
randomly distributed across the population. If being a sophisticate is
instead correlated with some other factors, the analysis could
change. 76 To offer three examples, sophistication could be correlated
with the costs of reducing negative externalities (or producing positive
ones), with sensitivity to price instruments, and with the efficiency of
the price instrument for that producer.
Take first a correlation between sophistication and costs. Suppose,
for example, that sophisticates are also better-informed about new
technologies and therefore have already adopted production methods
that would allow them to adapt to a low-emissions regime. In that
scenario, for somewhat technical reasons recited in the margin, it is
more plausible that full gross-up could be more appealing than partial
gross-up.' 77 More interesting are correlations between salience and a
173 For an overview of these provisions, see Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 113th Cong., Esti-
mate of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012-2017, at 2-28 (Comm.Print 2013),
available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4503.
174 That is, the expenditures largely take the form of a deduction or exclusion, rather
than a credit. See Batchelder et al., note 140, at 24.
175 For evidence that taxpayers may be unaware of their marginal rate, see Jeffrey B.
Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (2004) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/auerbach/e231_sp05/schmeduling.pdf, and
for a review of earlier studies, see Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Cruci-
ble of Tax Policy, in Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality 309, 309-34 (Joel Slemrod ed.,
1994).
176 See Allcott et al., note 7, at 79, for more discussion of correlations between cognitive
or willpower failures and externality or internality production.
177 In essence, there then would be two cost curves, one above tau and farther to the
right for sophisticates, and one below tau and farther to the left for nalve producers. Re-
call that there is a zero lower bound, at the right-hand side of the graph, representing the
maximum possible reduction of emissions. See note 128 (discussing this corner solution).
Shifting the cost curve rightwards would bring sophisticates closer to this boundary. If
losses are bounded enough, there may be little to be gained from reducing the degree of
gross-up. In other words, if most producers would eliminate all pollution even with gross-
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producer's responsiveness to price instruments in general. In particu-
lar, if naivet6 (e> 1) is correlated with lower responsiveness to price
instruments, hypersalience would allow the government in effect to
set a "nonlinear" tax, that is, to allow for different prices for different
portions of the population. To see why this is useful, step back for a
moment and suppose that sticks typically are imposed at some time
after the negative externality is generated, and that discount rates-
the rate at which we compare present to future costs-vary across
producers. Extensive evidence now suggests that some humans are
excessively impatient-they grab present rewards without fully con-
sidering the later consequences.1 78
Galle and Utset and Heutel each note that in this case uniform
Pigouvian pricing under-deters impatient actors. 179 That is, because
the good is consumed now, but the penalty is imposed later, the impa-
tient are not as sensitive to penalties as the government expected. If
the government could, it would threaten the impatient with larger
sticks. But as most commentators have noted, it is difficult to see how
one could easily let prices vary from individual to individual based on
characteristics that individuals can control or misrepresent. 80 There-
fore the government usually has to trade off fully deterring the impa-
tient against over-deterring the normally patient.
Hypersalience could be a useful tool for overcoming this problem.
Impatience and the propensity to treat sticks as hypersalient could
well be correlated. Theorists of satisficing and other mental shortcuts
similar in impact to salience note that impatience could be an explana-
tion for satisficing behavior. 181 Impatient people are unwilling to in-
vest the effort now to get information that will help them in the
future. That may be unfortunate for these impatient individuals, but
notice how handy it is for the government. By making its stick hyper-
salient, the government increases perceived costs, but this increase is
down, the government might as well get the revenue benefits of full gross-up from other
producers.
178 See generally George Ainslie, Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Succes-
sive Motivational States Within the Person 56-96 (reissue ed. 2010); Shane Frederick,
George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Crit-
ical Review, in Advances in Behavioral Economics 162 (Colin F. Camerer, George Loew-
enstein & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004); Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on
Dynamic Inconsistency, in Quasi Rational Economics 127 (1991).
179 Galle & Utset, note 154, at 74-82; Garth Heutel, Optimal Policy Instruments for Ex-
ternality-Producing Durable Goods under Time Inconsistency 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 17083, 2011), available at www.nber.org/papers/Wl7083.pdf.
180 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, note 34, at 6 n.7.
181 See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retire-
ment, in Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics 125, 125-26 (Henry J. Aaron
ed., 1999).
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concentrated among the impatient, the group that needs to face a
higher price.182
A third interesting potential correlation would be a relationship be-
tween the likelihood of being a naive producer and being an in-
framarginal one. Recall that an inframarginal producer is someone
who would have produced the externality even without the govern-
ment's intervention. Money spent incentivizing these actors, espe-
cially costly carrot dollars, is largely wasted.183 Suppose salience is
correlated with marginality-for example, perhaps those who are un-
certain about whether to donate undertake more of an investigation
into the benefits of giving. Then when carrots must be claimed, sali-
ence functions as a traditional costly screen because it targets incen-
tives to those whose behavior is most dependent on them.184
Aid to the poor may be an example of where this kind of screening
device could be useful.185 It is well known that considerably fewer
than 100% of eligible recipients claim most forms of government sup-
port, 1 6 and salience could be one reason why.' 87 Chetty and Saez
find evidence suggesting that the complexities of the EITC contribute
to taxpayers failing to take full advantage of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). 88 But suppose that highly-educated households are
182 See Allcott et al., note 7, at 75, for more discussion in the "internality" context.
183 See Stefanie Engel, Stefano Pagiola & Sven Wunder, 65 Ecological Econ. 663, 670
n.188 (2008).
18 See, e.g., Allcott et al., note 7, at 82, 84 tbl.3.; see also Jonathan S. Masur, Costly
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. Legal Analysis 687, 688-91 (2010), for more discus-
sion of screening techniques.
185 For arguments in favor of screening beneficiaries of government programs, see Al-
bert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions on Re-
cipients, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 372, 372-77 (1982). For skeptical commentary on screening,
see David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model
for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 Yale L.J. 815, 844-56 (2004).
186 See e.g., Karl Kronebusch & Brian Elbel, Enrolling Children in Public Insurance:
SCHIP, Medicaid, and State Implementation, 29 J. Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. 451, 452 (2004).
187 Cf. Pat Redmond, Judith Solomon & Mark Lin, Ctr. on Budget & Pol'y Priorities,
Can Incentives for Healthy Behavior Improve Health and Hold Down Medicaid Costs? 2
(2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-1-07health.pdf (reporting a study that
found potential beneficiaries did not understand financial incentive programs). Prior evi-
dence finds important roles for psychological factors in benefit uptake rates, but these
studies mostly focus on participants' attitudes towards government, the program, and their
own self-image in relation to those. See e.g., Julie Christian & Dominic Abrams, A Tale of
Two Cities: Predicting Homeless People's Uptake of Outreach Programs in London and
New York, 26 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 169, 169-80 (2004); Sean Nicholson-Crotty,
The Impact of Program Design on Enrollment in State Children's Health Insurance Pro-
grams, 35 Pol'y Stud. J. 23, 28 (2007) (noting most scholars attribute low uptake rates to
"stigma").
188 Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an
Experiment with EITC Recipients, 5 Am. Econ. J. Applied Econ. 1, 1-2 (2013). Perhaps
similarly, a number of studies find that government outreach efforts improves uptake rates,
Nicholson-Crotty, note 187, at 29, though this increased enrollment may also be due to the
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more likely to understand the EITC's cumbersome limitations rules,
and therefore would be more "sophisticated"-the EITC is not hyper-
salient for them. These households have higher earning potential on
average 8 9 and so arguably should not be the target of government
support. The effect of salience, then, would be that the neediest
households would be those most likely to apply for the EITC, increas-
ing its efficacy. Of course, it also seems possible that benefits could be
least salient to those who need them most.190 Government should
work to remedy these kinds of negative correlations.
One disclaimer to these possibilities is that I have assumed so far
that individuals who are insufficiently aware of a carrot will not re-
ceive it. Think here of charitable contribution deductions that must
be claimed on a tax return, or the patent application that must be
filed, or the pages-long information form for federally-subsidized stu-
dent loans. Yet some carrots might be claimed automatically. Price
supports for milk, corn, and other farm productsl 91 have sometimes
been designed as automatic carrots. The government boosts prices by
buying up supply during boom years.192 Farmers need do nothing but
literally reap the benefits and bring them to market. Presumably the
price supports are in place to encourage steady production of nation-
ally-important domestic food supplies.193 Some farmers might never
know that the price supports exist, and if they would have farmed any-
way, they get the benefits regardless.194
reduced effort and stigma attached to programs for which government workers try to en-
roll beneficiaries. See Kelly M. Purtell, Elizabeth T. Gershoff & J. Lawrence Aber, Low
Income Families' Utilization of the Federal "Safety Net": Individual and State-Level
Predictors of TANF and Food Stamp Receipt, 34 Child Youth Serv. Rev. 713, 722 (2012).
189 Gary S. Fields, Accounting for Income Inequality and its Change: A New Method,
with Application to the Distribution of Earnings in the United States, 22 Research in La-
bor Econ. 1, 29-30 (Soloman W. Polacheck ed., 2003) (reporting that education is the most
important predictor of household income).
190 Purtell et. al., note 188, at 721-23 (reporting that uptake increased with measures of
family need, but noting that non-English speaking households had lower uptake rates); Raj
Chetty, John N. Friedman & Emmanuel Saez, Using Differences in Knowledge Across
Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings, 103 Am. Econ. Rev.
2683, 2684-85 (2013). (describing regional pattern of awareness of EITC provisions).
191 As far as I am aware, there are no carrots for carrots, however.
192 For a summary of the current milk price-support programs, including both the gov-
ernment buying policy as well as the similarly automatic system of price controls for milk
buyers, see Ralph M. Chite, Cong. Research Serv., IB97011, Dairy Policy Issues 5-8 (2005),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/IB97011 20051110.pdf.
193 Jim Monke, Cong. Research Serv., RL33271, Farm Commodity Programs: Direct
Payments, Counter-Cyclical Payments, and Marketing Loans 1-3 (2006), available at http://
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33271.pdf.
194 Inframarginal farmers drive up the expense of cost-stabilization plans by generating
excess production the government must buy during boom years. Farm subsidies may also
be captured by nonfarmers, such as owners of farmland. Barrett E. Kirwan, The Incidence
Accountants, and more recently Turbotax, might supply another ex-
ample. 195 If this author's experience is representative, even well-in-
formed taxpayers may be surprised at the end of the year to discover
some of their available deductions. These tax benefits do have to be
claimed, but because the taxpayer does not have to take any action on
her own to claim them-except for hiring an accountant or buying tax
preparation software that asks, "Did you weatherize your home this
year?"-they are effectively automatic. As a result, using the Code to
deliver carrots can increase uptake rates, but at the potential cost of
increasing payouts to inframarginal recipients.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS
For all the possibilities that the combination of salience and
Pigouvian pricing has offered in my analysis so far, I have not yet
touched on perhaps the most important implication. As I mentioned
earlier, standard economic analysis strongly favors sticks over carrots
in most settings, though I have also suggested that that result should
be qualified in some circumstances.19 6 I now argue that it is possible
that salience could increase carrots' appeal, perhaps to the point
where carrots are viable policy alternatives to sticks in some situa-
tions. If I am right, the triumph of carrots would be a dramatic rever-
sal of well-settled conventional wisdom. But admittedly, because my
suggestions here depend on strong assumptions about the way that
salience works, these possibilities are even more tentative than those
of the previous Part.
A. Repeated Games
At least since Coase, the key factor weighing against carrots is the
incentives carrots offer for gamesmanship. 197 Paying off today's pol-
luters to clean up their act encourages future generations of entrepre-
neurs to invest in polluting.198 Rewarding good deeds with cash
indicates to do-gooders that they should wait for payouts instead of
volunteering.
of U.S. Agricultural Subsidies on Farmland Rental Rates, 117 J. Pol. Econ. 138, 151-53
(2009).
195 For further discussion of the relationship between TurboTax and tax administration,
see Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax Revolution: Can Technology Save Tax Complexity?,
in The Crisis in Tax Administration 124, 128-37 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2004); Zelenak, note 74, at 98-116.
196 See Galle, note 4, at 813-40.
197 See Wiener, note 4, at 726.
198 Id. at 726-27.
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But suppose that only current carrot recipients can perceive the car-
rot. A highly opaque carrot could reach just these existing producers,
but would not encourage new entries into the field. If so, that would
help considerably to mitigate carrots' tendency to attract new negative
externality producers who want to be paid to stop. For instance, 0=1
could be strongly correlated with being someone who is already pro-
ducing an externality. Farmers probably follow the details of farmers'
aid programs more closely than do architects or archaeologists. Re-
cipients of new carrots are likely to be highly informed about the car-
rot program's details because they were the ones who lobbied for it,
while the rationally ignorant general public paid little attention.199
Arbitrageurs may in time close this gap, however, which perhaps ar-
gues for time-limiting low-salience carrot programs.
Confidential settlement agreements offer a possible real-world ex-
ample of this phenomenon. In "responsive" or cooperative regula-
tion, government regulators may waive penalties for violations
committed by "good" or cooperative actors, especially if those actors
voluntarily disclose their misstep to the regulator.200 Often a condi-
tion of the waiver or settlement agreement is that the regulator will
not announce the terms.201 Some commentators criticize this practice,
justifiably, for reducing government accountability and perhaps di-
minishing the expressive component of punishment.202 But it also
serves to reduce the salience of the potential carrot for those who
have not yet entered the cooperative program. In this way, the regu-
lator may be able to shrink any temptation for private actors to do
wrong on the assumption they will still get a carrot (a welcome depar-
ture from expected costs) later down the line. While actors may know
199 Cf. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 240-59 (1957) (setting out
theory of rationally ignorant voters). For evidence on the extent of voter information, see
Stephen Earl Bennett, Trends in Americans' Political Information, 1967-1987, 17 Am. Pol.
Q. 422, 426-29 (1989) (finding that voter knowledge was consistently low for the twenty
years studied).
200 See generally Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending
the Deregulation Debate (1992) (providing a theoretical overview); Jodi L. Short &
Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical
Role of the Legal Environment, 55 Admin. Sci. Q. 361 (2010) (providing a helpful discus-
sion and quantitative assessment).
201 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095,
1176 (2006); see also Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. Corp. L. 679, 702 (2009) (noting that agreements are confi-
dential); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853, 885
(2007). In part, this appears to be motivated by a desire to avoid follow-on litigation by
third parties, such as other regulators or private plaintiffs. Id. at 1173-74.
202 See Ford & Hess, note 201, at 702, 723; see also Ronald Wright & Marc Miller,
Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1409, 1410-13 (2003) (making
these points about opacity of plea bargaining generally).
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that the cooperation program exists, their uncertainty concerning its
value reduces the resulting moral hazard.
B. Inframarginal Producers
This kind of selective salience can also help overcome another car-
rot shortcoming in the production of positive externalities. In-
framarginality tends to diminish the efficacy of carrots offered to
benefit producers. Again, some good-hearted people would generate
benefits for others without explicit rewards, but these folk are usually
able to collect their carrot regardless. If the producers anticipate that
a carrot might be forthcoming (or increasing) in the future, they may
hold off on their beneficial activity until it arrives, so that carrots can
actually crowd out the externalities they are aimed at creating. 203 But
suppose a correlation between high 0 and producers who are not in-
framarginal. That is, what if only marginal producers see the carrot?
For instance, charitable fundraisers may concentrate their efforts on
individuals who would not otherwise give or give as much, increasing
awareness of tax benefits among that population. 204
In the other direction, hypersalience could also potentially be used
to trim back inframarginality. If sophisticates are mostly in-
framarginal, dropping the price of the carrot by definition will not re-
duce their desire to produce. Policymakers could then improve
welfare by lowering the carrot price and increasing hypersalience. Na-
ive producers, attracted by the overly-visible subsidy, will continue to
contribute, while the sophisticates will not change their behavior.
Why would sophistication and inframarginality be correlated? By
definition the inframarginal producer is less inclined to free ride on
the efforts of others when it comes to positive externalities tied to the
given good. She therefore could also be more willing to invest in lob-
bying for greater subsidies for that good, or at least to invest in follow-
ing the issue closely. Less abstractly, inframarginal donors could be
motivated by ideological commitment to their cause, and that would
make them follow its progress more intensively.205 In the charitable
context, inframarginal donors are often motivated by "warm glow," or
203 See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy 212
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1975).
204 There is evidence to support that possibility. A number of studies find that fundrais-
ing usually increases donations at the individual firm level. See e.g., Adrian Sargeant &
Jurgen Kahler, Returns on Fundraising Expenditures in the Voluntary Sector, 10 Nonprofit
Mgmt. & Leadership 5, 10-16 (2003). This result could be consistent with a story in which
firms that fundraise more intensively simply shift donors away from other firms, however.
205 See Allcott et al., note 7, at 9-10 (suggesting that "'green' consumers who derive
warm glow from purchasing the more energy efficient product .. . might give more weight
to energy efficiency. . . .").
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the good feelings that come with giving.206 Some evidence suggests
that part of this warm glow is that being a philanthropist is a status
symbol, and that donations are a luxury good that appeals especially
strongly to the wealthy who want to signal their wealth.207 In-
framarginality would then correlate with sophistication to the extent
that sophistication is correlated with wealth.208
Alternately, consider the possibility I raised earlier that salience is
an effective form of screen for sorting government benefit recipi-
ents.209 If needier families are less attuned to the downsides of a pro-
gram, making it hypersalient for them, the program overall can be
more efficient. These kinds of effects may mitigate the welfare costs
of carrots enough to make them worthwhile as policy choices, al-
though perhaps still not as desirable as a comparable stick.
C. Income Effects
A third flaw in most carrot programs involves income effects. Re-
call that income effects make carrots for positive externalities more
effective by increasing demand for the desired good (as long as it is a
normal or luxury good). 210 If this income effect remains somewhat
salient even as the substitution effect of the carrot is submerged, gov-
ernment can increase production without triggering any of the un-
wanted side effects of a dose of carrots. In most contexts the income
effect from changing one item in a household's budget will be small
enough that this strategy would not likely be cost-effective. But if
other policy options are unworkable, the low-salience carrot is worth
keeping in the toolkit.
Another possible income effect involves a high-6 of substitution
combined with a low-e of income. In other words, producers know
the cost of each item, but are not as aware of its total impact on their
budget. If that seems like an unlikely combination, imagine that we
know there is a tax on some tempting item-this author is fond of
chocolate-covered cashews-but we are not sure how much of it we
will be able to keep ourselves from consuming. The evidence is that
206 See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research
Handbook 568, 572-81 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
207 See Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1019, 1019-621 (1996).
208 But see Goldin & Homonoff, note 62, at 325 ("attentiveness to cigarette register
taxes declines monotonically by income").
209 See text accompanying notes 183-89.
210 See Figure 1 and text accompanying note 48.
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humans are bad at predicting their own willpower. 211 At the time we
draw up our budgets, we might not know how much to set aside for
cashew costs even if we know exactly the price of each can.2 12 Manuel
Utset and I earlier made this argument about energy taxes. 2 13
In any event, assuming the high-O of substitution/low-0 of income
combination is plausible, it can be somewhat useful to carrot-wielding
policymakers. Carrots confound government's goals when aimed at
negative externalities, since the increased wealth of recipients makes
them produce or demand more of the unwanted good. If the income
effects of the carrot are obscured, this impact can be softened, which
again could make carrots marginally more useful-or at least mitigate
the damage from a flawed political process that overly relies on them.
V. LEARNING & TRANSITIONS
The discussion so far has assumed a mostly static world in which the
salience of a tax instrument is relatively fixed. But despite the best
efforts of cable news and reality television producers, humans do oc-
casionally move from ignorance to wisdom. If people quickly learn to
understand sticks and carrots, salience may be of relatively little im-
portance. Theory and some evidence suggest, though, that salience
effects can persist for long periods. That implies, happily, that the
work of ploughing through the previous four Parts was not in vain.
But lawmakers should also give some thought to how to manage grad-
ual shifts in public understanding of price instruments.
A. Theory & Evidence on Learning
I have argued in other work that we should not expect learning to
be pervasive. 214 If individuals "intentionally" ignore hidden prices be-
cause they believe the cost of calculating the price exceeds the bene-
fits, the same often will be true of the cost of educating oneself to be
more mindful in the future-or the same but even more so, because
the benefits of education are postponed farther into the future.215
Individuals whose cognitive limitations curtail their ability to ac-
count for a cost-for example, because they lack the willpower to
211 See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
Econ. Literature 315, 320 (2009); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procras-
tination, 116 Q.J. Econ. 121, 150 (2001).
212 See Chetty et al., note 60, at 1145-48, 1174 (explaining the household budgeting pro-
cess under uncertainty about hidden taxes).
213 Galle & Utset, note 154, at 57-60.
214 Galle, note 6, at 89-93. For arguments that learning may be difficult in the context of
the charitable contribution deduction, see Faulhaber, note 14, at 1323-26.
215 Galle, note 6, at 88.
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make themselves engage in the painful act of thinking about math-
may similarly be limited in their capacity to force themselves to
learn.216 Weak incentives and low credibility limit the usefulness of
third-party instructors.217 For example, competitors of third-party
beneficiaries of a hypersalient stick might have weak incentives to dis-
abuse consumers because each competitor would capture only a frac-
tion of the resulting business. 218 Consumers may know precisely the
extent of a tax but lack the willpower or wherewithal to apply that
information to purchase decisions.219
Even if every economic actor eventually learns every detail of every
price instrument, the fact would remain that all sticks are hidden
sometimes. Logically, when a new price instrument is introduced,
there is inevitably a period in which not all of the relevant economic
actors are aware of it.220 Like any other piece of information that
influences commodity prices, understanding of a new stick'slegal
structure of may diffuse unevenly across the economy.221
While there is some evidence that individuals can learn about hid-
den pricing, the findings often imply significant gaps in public under-
standing. For example, in the tax context, taxpayers can be taught to
negotiate the complexities of the EITC.222 But that same study im-
plies that in the absence of professional assistance, most of the study
participants were baffled by the EITC. In my work with Jonathan
Klick, we suggest that our findings on the effect of the Alternative
Minimum Tax on local spending can be explained (among other possi-
ble ways) by the willingness of taxpayers who expect AMT liability to
invest in learning about its impact.223 Other taxpayers who pay AMT
do not appear to be as responsive, perhaps reflecting their ignorance
of its many nuances. 224
Learning may also take a fair bit of time. Bakija & Heim report
that donors to charity initially seem to neglect changes in tax rewards
216 See Galle & Utset, note 154, at 76-78.
217 See Galle, note 6, at 91-92.
218 See Gabaix & Laibson, note 5, at 505-23, 526-32.
219 For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft report that the consumers they studied
knew fairly precisely the sales tax rate; they simply failed to apply that knowledge to
purchase decisions. Chetty et al., note 60, at 1165.
220 For an early theoretical overview of the obstacles to the formation of a full-informa-
tion equilibrium, see Steve Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am.
Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 240, 240-45 (1976). For later theory, see Dirk Bergemann &
Juuso Valimaki, Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning, 28 RAND J. Econ. 773, 776-
78 (1997).
221 For evidence, see Atakan Yalhin, Gradual Information Diffusion and Contrarian
Strategies, 48 Q. Rev. Econ. & Fin. 579, 586-97 (2008).
222 Chetty & Saez, note 188, at 1.
223 Galle & Klick, note 14, at 246.
224 Id. at 225-36.
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for giving, but that over time, a year or so on average, there are signs
that some adapt.2 2 5 Survey data from Goldin and Listokin on the low
public awareness of the marginal value of charitable contributions
suggests that the transition period may be longer than the average
reader may expect. 226 Miller and Mumford find some evidence con-
sistent with learning among higher-income households, but not until
four years after the policy change they study.227 And I have argued
that a prominent behavioral public finance puzzle can be explained by
learning, with the evidence suggesting that voters take several years to
understand the combined effects of federal and state fiscal
instruments. 228
Whether learning is durable is another question. Sumit Agarwal,
John Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson find, for example,
that financial sophistication first rises but then dwindles with age.2 2 9
Other lab studies report similarly that subjects sometimes recall only a
portion of what they learn. 230 Readers who have taken a final exam
recently, or graded one, may have some familiarity with the latter
phenomenon.
Third-party actors can also shape the accuracy of public percep-
tions. In some regions of the country there appear to be social net-
works that facilitate the spread of EITC information, but in others
these networks are absent.231 Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert
Tyran find peer-to-peer learning about tax-like instruments in a labo-
ratory setting.232 But there can also be third-party misinformation. 233
Goldin and Listokin report that a statistically significant portion of
225 Bakija & Heim, note 146, at 636; see also Bridget Terry Long, The Impact of Federal
Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses, in College Choices: The Economics of Where
to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It 101, 122-28 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004)
(reporting results of two studies finding low awareness of education tax credits passed two
years earlier, even among families that were eligible).
226 Goldin & Listokin, note 70, at 7-8.
227 Miller & Mumford, note 67, at 18-19.
228 Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 875, 924-30 (2008).
229 Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, The Age of Rea-
son: Financial Decisions over the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulation, Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2009, at 51.
230 See Galle, note 6, at 92-93, for a summary.
231 Chetty et al., note 190, at 2-3.
232 See generally Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Are We Taxing Ourselves?
How Deliberation and Experience Shape Voting on Taxes, 95 J. Pub. Econ. 164 (2011).
Note, however, that in the Sausgruber and Tyran experiment peers had nothing to gain
from the financial ignorance of their fellow participants. In reality, as Gabaix & Laibson,
note 5, at 505-23, argue, sophisticated consumers can often benefit from the ignorance of
others. For empirical evidence to this effect, see Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer
Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J. Pub. Econ. 39 (2013).
233 Cf. Allcott et al., note 7, at 83 (noting that private firms can hide information the
government would like to be more salient).
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their survey respondents over-valued the home mortgage interest de-
duction. 234 This may be due to advertising efforts. Two recent studies
find that homeowners who do not see their bi-annual property tax bill,
but instead allow the bill to be paid on their behalf by the mortgage
lender, are less responsive to their property taxes.235
B. Learning and Price-Instrument Transitions
At a minimum, then, the lessons of the last Section imply a need for
careful treatment of transitions into new price-instrument regimes.
After a new price instrument is introduced, it likely has low salience
for some fraction of the population. Or, if it has a highly visible
"sticker" price but lots of complex exceptions, it may be hypersalient.
For some period of time, the policymaker's tool will not have its ex-
pected effects.
The analysis of Part III implies that the efficient price of a price
instrument should change as the public's perception of it changes. For
example, if we think that the public will tend to have 0 < 1 in the first
year of a new stick program, the price of the stick therefore should be
grossed-up above its full-salience price. As the stick's salience in-
creases with time, the price should decline. Sticks, in other words,
should transition in downwards.
One immediate word of caution about this result is that it may in-
crease arbitrage opportunities for pre-existing owners of affected
property. First, note that when salience varies among the population,
there usually will be chances for trades that benefit the better-in-
formed party. For instance, suppose that the salience of a stick is cor-
related with owning an asset that will be subject to that stick. When
the over-priced stick is introduced, existing owners would then be
more likely to discount the value of their property by the correct
amount, while nonowners would over-value the property. Existing
owners could then sell to nonowners at a profit.236 Because a stick
that "transitions down" would necessarily involve an initially bigger
234 Goldin & Listokin, note 70, at 9.
235 Cabral & Hoxby, note 82; Hayashi, note 83.
236 For evidence, see Sebastien Bradley, Capitalizing on Capped Taxable Values: How
Michigan Homebuyers Are Paying for Assessment Limits 3 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-sebbrad/Sebastien 
- Bradley-
JMP.pdf (reporting that "homebuyers dramatically overcompensate sellers of homes with
temporarily low tax obligations as if such obligations would persist indefinitely"). The new
owners in turn could potentially pass on the hot potato to new unwitting buyers, although
at some point (as standard equilibrium theory predicts) most buyers will likely notice that
the "smart money" is selling (even if the nalve buyer does not know why) and will refuse to
pay a premium any longer.
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stick, it would increase the rewards sophisticated prior owners could
extract from naYve buyers.
Most theorists of legal transitions would argue that allowing pre-
existing owners to profit from a new stick is undesirable. A sales pre-
mium for prior owners is economically equivalent to a legal rule pro-
viding compensation to owners for the lost value of their property.237
As many other commentators have argued, a compensation rule inef-
ficiently encourages owners to develop their property in ways that
would generate negative externalities-or, similarly, allows them to
under-invest in efforts to produce positive externalities.238
But this problem may not be serious and could likely be readily
mitigated. Unwanted incentive effects would arise only if owners can
predict that any future stick will have low enough salience to generate
a market for their arbitrage. Even if this were common, potential so-
lutions include an "exit tax" on pre-existing owners or mandatory dis-
closure of the true price of the stick to prospective buyers.
Transition policy for carrots is a bit different. In the case of low-
salience carrots, again the government should "transition down," with
the initial price being higher than optimal under full salience, and then
declining as the public learns about the new instrument's effects. In a
nice change of pace for carrot fans, the challenges here are a bit less
daunting than for stick transitions. Since naive purchasers perceive
carrots as less valuable than sophisticated existing owners, there is no
arbitrage opportunity for the crafty owner. Of course, if sophistica-
tion is not strongly correlated with prior ownership, sophisticates
might poach high-value property from naive owners. Even if society
is indifferent about the distribution of the carrot's benefits, this partic-
ular transfer is welfare-reducing, since the new owner now will waste-
fully over-exploit the carrot. But the transition downward limits the
size of the poacher's prize, and again disclosure requirements could
help mitigate the problem.
Another possible design choice for carrots is to make them tempo-
rary. In Part IV, I suggested that carrots may be more appealing when
237 See Wiener, note 4, at 726 n.186.
238 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 590-92 (1984); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Anal-
ysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 529-31 (1986).
Some commentators defend compensation on other grounds. For example, the need to
raise money to pay for compensation might discourage inefficient regulation, such as might
result from rent-seeking by other interest groups. Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change:
An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity 77-78 (2000).
For skeptical treatment of that argument, see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Govern-
ment in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 968-71 (2005); Daryl J. Levinson, Mak-
ing Governments Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 345, 373-77, 388-93 (2000).
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they are hidden from some portion of the population, whether that be
inframarginal producers or individuals who might threaten harm if
they thought it would prompt government to pay them. Alternately,
as I noted in Part III, low-salience carrots are less harmful than fully
salient, inefficient subsidies. Many current tax breaks are obscure and
difficult for the general public to notice, but that may be just as well:
If more people knew about them, they would claim them.239 If carrots
are only temporarily hidden, these benefits could fade. A possible re-
sponse, then, would be either to switch from the carrot to a stick as
the program ages, or instead simply to limit the time in which the in-
centive is offered. A number of existing tax incentives have this kind
of "sunset" feature.240 That is typically due to the idiosyncrasy of con-
gressional budgeting rules.241 My analysis here offers another poten-
tial reason to favor temporary tax breaks, at least assuming that the
tax breaks are to be enacted anyway.242
Finally, it might be argued that learning should be met, not with
transition policy, but instead with an abandonment of cognitively com-
plex price instruments. Learning itself may be costly. Arguably the
time and effort invested in analyzing a new price instrument is dead-
weight loss for each actor.243 If externality producers were perfectly
rational, they would invest effort in learning up to the point at which
further investments no longer produce gains.2" Even producers who
chose not to learn would still incur some decision costs: the costs of
deciding whether it is worthwhile to learn about the stick.245 In order
to hide large prices from the public, the government would need to
make those prices very difficult to identify. The implication is that the
239 Of course, the obscurity of the breaks may also factor into whether they are enacted
at all; it may be that low market salience and high political salience is the best combination
for these kinds of inefficient giveaways.
240 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1017-21 (2011).
241 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 Tax Notes 1553,
1553 (June 9,2003); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability,
and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 188-92 (2009). For a normative defense of
temporary tax rules, see Yin, supra, at 232-53; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legis-
lation, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247, 266-72 (2007) (offering qualified defense of temporary law
generally). For a critique, see Kysar, note 240, at 1051-65.
242 Admittedly, however, the incentives of actors who are aware of the temporary nature
of legislation greatly complicate efforts to accurately price temporary price instruments.
Agents may shift future activity forward in time to the period of the subsidy, or may ignore
the subsidy because obtaining it requires high fixed costs that will not be paid off over the
temporary life of the instrument. Gersen, note 241, at 278.
243 See Kysar, note 240, at 1064 (pointing out that temporary legislation increases plan-
ning costs for affected private interests).
244 See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. Econ. Literature 669, 686-87
(1996) (examining incentives for actors to invest in costly learning).
245 See id. (describing this "regress" problem).
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deadweight loss of learning from a pricey and highly opaque stick
could be substantial.
But that story is a worst-case scenario. Low-salience sticks are
more promising if low salience is often the product of impatience and
procrastination. That is, for some actors it might easily be worthwhile
(in the abstract) to analyze a price instrument, but in the moment they
face that decision they overly weight the present inconvenience rela-
tive to the far-off gains of making a correct decision. In that case, the
government can generate meaningful salience effects even though the
mental effort needed to fully identify the price effect is small, implying
that the deadweight loss of learning is minor. 246 Further, the price of
learning is likely not purely deadweight loss. 2 4 7 As your high-school
math teacher would argue, thinking about finance helps to develop
cognitive skills that are generally useful and builds information that
can be shared with others. For example, skill at identifying prices with
low market salience may also facilitate recognition of carrots with low
political salience, which can constrain rent-seeking by other external-
ity producers. Learning to overcome salience, in other words, can
produce positive externalities. 248
VI. CONCLUSION
The study of policies intended to sway real humans, rather than to
affect the platonic ideal of rational actors, is only beginning. At this
stage in our understanding of how individuals cope with complex sys-
tems of price and other information, it is too early to say with confi-
dence that a particular approach is clearly right or wrong. My effort
here has been to begin to explore some possibilities, given what we
know now.
What I think I have shown is that some well-settled assumptions
may be incorrect, and that some recent advances can be further re-
fined. Carrots are not necessarily always inferior to sticks, once sali-
ence and its potential correlations are taken into account. Fully
246 Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Mat-
thew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1219 (2003).
247 See Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Soren Leth-Petersen, Torben Heien Nielsen &
Tore Olsen, Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings Accounts:
Evidence from Denmark (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18565, 2012)
available at obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/crowdout.pdf (reporting beneficial effects of eco-
nomics training on ability to plan retirement savings).
248 The extent of the positive externality likely depends on legal rules governing the
enactment and interpretation of the stick. In particular, if legal rules constrain sophisti-
cates from lobbying for special benefits for themselves, their lobbying efforts are more
likely to affect others (in some cases positively, in some not).
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salient price instruments may not always be ideal. Government
should likely adjust the prices of its taxes and subsidies at least to
account for the process of learning and diffusion of information across
the economy. And these adjustments may be closer to optimal if they
balance revenue and other needs against the correction of
externalities.
My hope is that these tentative thoughts can be the building blocks
for further efforts both theoretical and empirical. For example, if I am
on the right track about the relevance of salience for the choice of
price instruments, it will be important to have more and better empir-
ics on the relationship between salience and such factors as the pro-
pensity to emit externalities. Designing the best price for an
instrument will require better data on the distribution of salience
across the population, the extent to which it is correlated with wealth
and income, and the likelihood that increased prices will themselves
affect incentives to learn more about government's regulatory tools.
The work, in short, is just beginning.
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